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I. INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
The People's Republic of China ("China" or "the PRC") has
changed tremendously since the end of the Cultural Revolution. The
economy has gone through rapid growth and the Chinese people's liv-
ing standard has risen considerably. New high-rises are altering the
skylines in the cities and large numbers of cars and trucks are already
congesting the newly built expressways and tollroads. In the new de-
partment stores, the supply of merchandise rivals the West. The private
and collective/township sectors are thriving.
However, political liberalization has not followed the rapid eco-
nomic changes. While the current government is nowhere near as op-
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pressive as the government during the Cultural Revolution, China to-
day is still a one-party state with little regard for democracy or human
rights. Officially, China is a communist country with a "socialist" mar-
ket economy. In reality, communism is dead and China is quickly
transforming itself into a society powered by brutal capitalism. How-
ever, the ideological justification for communist party power monopoly
continues to be that China is still a communist society.
According to Marx, the means of production has to be controlled
by the state in order to achieve a communist society. The Chinese
Revolution was largely a result of the hate for abusive landowners. Af-
ter the revolution, private ownership of land was abolished. However,
today many factories are privately owned and the notion of a private
land system exists. How does this private ownership work in a commu-
nist state? From an ideological standpoint, private ownership of the
means of production and communism are incompatible, so it is interest-
ing to investigate the structure of the current Chinese property rights
system and how it works. It is the purpose of this article to try to pre-
sent Chinese property law and discuss how property rights are
safeguarded.
Chinese property law is still developing and its legal structure is
different from that of Western law. Therefore, this article will not fol-
low a strict Western structure by dividing property into absolute, com-
plete rights like ownership and incomplete rights like mortgage or land-
use rights. Instead, the article is divided into private (movable) prop-
erty and real property (immovable).
To understand the environment that surrounds property rights in
China, an overview of the Chinese legal system will be presented first.
Then, property theory and private property will be discussed. As a
large part of China's property is still controlled by the state-owned en-
terprises, the problems concerning the state-run sector will also be ad-
dressed. Additionally, financial leasing is discussed in a separate chap-
ter to illustrate how the property system works (or does not work).
Finally, real property law will be discussed.
2. Historical Background
The Preamble to the PRC's 1982 Constitution notes that "China
is a country with one of the longest histories in the world." The Chi-
nese culture developed over thousands of years more or less isolated
from Western societies. Needless to say, Chinese customs and institu-
tions developed in different directions.
The Chinese legal tradition is primarily based on two philosophies,
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Confucianism and Legalist thought.' As early as the third century
B.C., there have been tensions between and influences from both phi-
losophies. The essence of Confucianism is the belief that desirable be-
havior and social harmony can be obtained through the rule of good
men. The examples set by these virtuous men are the best form of per-
suasion. Strict regulation or severe punishment is not considered effec-
tive.2 In the Confucian society, the group is more important than the
individual. Conflict destroys the harmony within the group and dis-
agreements are therefore settled through yielding and compromise.
Traditionally, courts have been perceived as outside the Confucian
norms of behavior and are to be avoided, since court proceedings ex-
pose the conflict and disrupt the harmony in the group.3 By contrast,
the Legalist tradition insists that society can achieve harmony only if
mischief is met with swift and severe punishment. The Legalists em-
phasize state power and control rather than morality. Law is viewed as
a deterrant.4
These two philosophies have existed side by side throughout Chi-
nese history, but the Confucian model behavior (1i) has had a stronger
influence on society than the written law (fa)5 promoted by the Legal-
ists.6 Over the ages, criminal law was the law that developed in China.
Any significant civil law did not develop due to a number of reasons.
The stress on 1i in the Chinese society meant that most disputes were
resolved outside courts. Those cases heard in court were all regarded as
criminal cases, since there was no concept of civil wrong or tort. In
Europe, the needs of commerce lead to a highly developed trade law. In
contrast, commerce was quite unregulated in imperial China.7 Instead
1. Daoism is, of course, also an influential philosophy in Chinese culture, but in
the area of law, the author has found the most influential philosophies to be Confucian-
ism and Legalist thought.
2. LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (Folsom, R.H. & Minan J.H.
eds., 1989).
3. See infra section 4.1.
4. LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 2, at 2.
5. Due to the stress on the group in Chinese society, the worst punishment was
considered to be banishment from this group. The Chinese character for law, fa, is
written as a combination of the character for water and travel. It means to send some-
body down the river or, in other words, banishment. Chinese law has its origins in
criminal law and that is manifested by the fact that one of the original meanings of the
present-day character for "law" in Chinese also meant a severe punishment. See
MINFA DA CIDIAN [LARGE DICTIONARY OF CIVIL LAW] 694 (Zhang Peilin et. al. eds.,
1991).
6. LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 2, at 2.
7. Wang Weiguo, Some Main Characteristics of The Traditional Legal Culture
of China, 5 JURIDISK TIDSKRIFT 588, 595-96 (1989-90).
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of laws, the Chinese merchants relied on trust, guarantors and a web of
interlocking obligations. Guilds and other nonofficial bodies were used
by the merchants to enforce contracts.8
An advanced property law did not develop in China. Western
property law concepts were first introduced with the adaptation of the
German Civil Code (Das Biirgerliches Gersetzbuch, or 'BGB') in the
early 1930s, but due to the constant state of war, the laws did not have
any real effect and were subsequently abolished by the communists in
1949. It was not only the influence of 1i and the lack of mercantile laws
that hindered the development of advanced property laws. Historically,
the Chinese emperor had a much stronger position in society than the
Western sovereign counterpart. There were no strong feudal lords in
China who created a balance of power that limited the options open to
the sovereign. The Chinese emperor could therefore confiscate and re-
distribute land with considerably less difficulty than Western govern-
ments could.9 Since the ultimate ownership of land was vested in the
government and large tracts of land were normally redistributed with
the change of ruling dynasties, notions of property rights were weak.
That is not to say that there did not exist any property law at all in
China. There did exist a property law that sometimes was very de-
tailed, but the law was not a strong protector of property rights.
By 1958, all land and most means of production were nationalized.
Land could now only be owned by the state or the collectives. The Chi-
nese peasants were put together into large People's Communes made
up of several thousand people. Within the commune system, teams of
about 40 families composed the smallest production and ownership
unit. Individuals owned little more than their clothes. In the cities peo-
ple worked and lived at their production units. Their apartments were
owned by the work unit. Although city dwellers normally owned more
property than the average farmer did, workers in general owned few
things. 10 Since vital property for the economy was not controlled by
private interests, there was no real need for an advanced property law
in pre-reform PRC.
In 1978, economic reforms began after Deng Xiaoping seized
power. After that, the development of the economy went quickly.1" The
8. W.J.F. JENNER & ALLEN LANE, THE TYRANNY OF HISTORY, THE ROOTS OF
CHINA'S CRISES 139-40 (1992).
9. Powelson, John P., Property in Chinese Development: Some Historical Com-
parisons, in ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 165, 177 (James
A Dorn & Xi Wang eds., 1990).
10. MAURICE J. MEISNER, MAO'S CHINA AND AFTER 153, 235 (1986).
11. Note that China's gross national product grew from 362 billion yuan in 1978
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commune system was dismantled and the government contracted out
farming to the peasants, creating a land-use right. Ownership of private
business was allowed and by 1992, a real estate market for urban land
existed and today venture capital can be raised through the stock
markets.
II. THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM
3. Chinese Constitutional Law
3.1. Property and the Law
The great and chief end . . . of men united into common-
wealths, and putting themselves under government, is the pres-
ervation of their property.
-John Locke 12
A well-functioning property rights system is vital for a market
economy. Without a credible legal system that protects ownership
rights and provides stable legal rules, people will be less inclined to
invest in long-term projects when return on the investment might take
many years. To sustain growth and prosperity, property rights require
the protection of fair and stable laws. In a market economy, it is the
task of the government to provide this security. While the current Chi-
nese legal system does not provide this essential security, the long-term
trend is positive. The Chinese legal system has substantially developed
since it started from virtually zero at the beginning of reform in 1978.
To understand the framework surrounding property law, it is helpful to
have a grasp of the overall Chinese legal system.
3.2. Western and Communist Constitutional Philosophy
A constitution is the most fundamental of all laws and provides for
the basic structure and powers of government. It enjoys the highest
degree of authority and all laws of the land must have support in the
constitution to be valid. On these points the Western and Communist
views of the constitution coincide, but while liberal democracies see
their constitutions as highly authoritative documents that serve as sta-
to 4.4. trillion yuan in 1994. STATE STATISTICAL BUREAU, CHINA STATISTICAL YEAR-
BOOK 20-21 (1995).
12. J. Locke, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 71 (Liberal Arts Press,
Inc. 1952)(1689).
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ble vanguards of democracy, Communist states tend to regard their
constitutions as policy documents whose theoretical supremacy does not
signify the same in practice.
The Western view is that the civil liberties of citizens need to be
protected from any governmental abuse. The government has to be reg-
ulated carefully by law. The law stands above the government. The
different government organs are separated and regulate each other
through a system of checks and balances. The citizens have enforceable
rights against the government and can bring suit against governmental
bodies in front of an independent judiciary. Many rights are considered
natural rights that attach at birth. Therefore, rights are not given by
legislation but merely protected by it.13
Whereas a Western constitution is meant to control the govern-
ment, a communist constitution is a tool for Party rule. The way law is
interpreted, implemented and modified is determined on the basis of
the Party's assessment of current conditions. As in the West, the com-
munist constitutions lay down the state structure and establish some
sort of balance of power system. In reality, however, these rules have
little meaning within a communist system. The formal state structure
often has little to do with how power is actually controlled in the State.
The supremacy of the Party means that the Constitution may be over-
ruled, especially when there is a conflict between the actions of the top
party leadership and the formal requirements and procedures pre-
scribed by law. 14 Rights are not considered to be "natural rights" that
are sacred, as in Western ideology, but as rights granted by the state
and subordinate to state interests. There are no natural rights. Rights
are given and taken away at the discretion of the omnipotent state.
3.3. The Chinese Constitution
3.3.1. Short History and Overview
The PRC has had five constitutions. The current one, the 1982
Constitution,1 follows the 1949 (Common Program), the 1954, the
1975 and the 1978 constitutions. The 1949 Common Program served
as a provisional constitution until the 1954 Constitution could be en-
13. Ian Hayne, Development Imperatives and the "Unitary State" in Post-Mao
Chinese Legal Rights 18 (1994) (unpublished Honor's thesis, Griffith University,
(Australia)).
14. CHEN, ALBERT H.Y., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 40 (1992).
15. The 1982 Constitution was adopted on December 4, 1984.
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acted. This, the first real Constitution of the PRC, was closely
modeled after the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union and empha-
sized the principles of "socialist legality." The 1954 Constitution
soon lost legal force as it was totally disregarded in the conduct of
radical economic policies and political campaigns. The 1975 Consti-
tution was a product of the Cultural Revolution era and reflected its
extreme leftist ideology."6 Due to its impracticality, it was soon re-
placed by the 1978 Constitution that moved away from the extreme
ideology of the Cultural Revolution. However, the 1978 Constitution
retained much of the same radical thinking that marked the previous
constitutions, such as the emphasis on "class struggle." It lacked pro-
visions needed for modernization. When the reformists under Deng
Xiaoping seized power in Beijing, they first amended the 1978 Con-
stitution and then adopted the 1982 Constitution, which emphasizes
production and economic development. 7 It also represents a return
to the "socialist legality model" of the 1954 Constitution. 8
All previous Chinese constitutions have been programmatic; the
current 1982 Constitution is no exception. A programmatic constitu-
tion defines a mission for the state and its citizens. The aim is to turn
China into a strong and prosperous, culturally advanced, democratic
socialist nation.' 9 Laws and legally defined rights are subordinate to
these overall goals of social and political development. Therefore, if
the law conflicts with a specific party policy, the law and not the
policy must be changed. 20
The power in China is, according to the Constitution, held by the
people's democratic dictatorship.2 The "people" includes all work-
ers, peasants, intellectuals and other patriots supporting socialism
and the unity of the motherland." All classes do not have equal sta-
tus. The state is "led by the working class on the alliance of workers
-and peasants" according to Article 1 of the Constitution. The leader-
ship of the working class is exercised through its political party, the
Chinese Communist Party (CPC). Thus, the domination by the CPC
in politics is justified by using basic Marxist-Leninist ideological
tenets. 13
16. CHEN, supra note 14, at 54.
17. Hayne, supra note 13, at 72.
18. CHEN, supra note 14, at 54.
19. P.R.C. CONST. (1982), pmbl., 1 7 (amended 1993).
20. Hayne, supra note 13, at 48.
21. P.R.C. CONST. art. 1.
22. CHEN, supra note 14, at 47.
23. CHEN, supra note 14, at 47.
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The Constitution is the highest law of the PRC.24 It is considered
the "mother-law" (mufa), from which all other laws are derived as if
they were its children (zifa). The Constitution has theoretical
supremacy over other laws, but this supremacy has little real mean-
ing. The Constitution is more of a guideline than a practical source
of law. The implementation of more than forty provisions in the Con-
stitution is dependent on further enactment of ordinary legislation.
The Constitution contains phrases such as "according to law,"
"within the scope of the law," and "subject to law." It is doubtful
whether the Constitution can be said to have any direct legal effect.
Courts are not allowed to rely on constitutional provisions directly in
deciding a case and can only apply the ordinary legislation (if there
is any). Furthermore, Chinese courts do not enjoy the power of re-
view of legislation to ensure that newly enacted laws conform to the
Constitution. 6 The Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress has the power of review, but has never exercised this
power.
3.3.2. State Structure and the Hierarchy of Norms
The people's power is exercised by the National People's Congress
(NPC) and the local people's congresses at various levels. 6 Members
of people's congresses at the county level and below are elected di-
rectly by the people.27 The lower level of people's congress then
elects the delegates of the next higher level.28 The NPC is the high-
est lawmaking power of the PRC. It issues the laws (falfi). There are
three levels of laws. Fundamental (geben) law, basic (jiben) law, and
specially enacted (danxing) law. The Constitution is a fundamental
law. Amendments require a special two-thirds majority of the
NPC' 9 Basic laws are laws such as the Criminal Code and General
Principles of Civil Law. They regulate certain aspects of social rela-
tions and provide general guidelines for specially enacted laws. Basic
laws are subordinate to the Constitution and can be changed with a
simple majority. 0 Specially enacted laws are laws that deal with one
specific area like the Economic Contract Law, the Trademark Law
24. P.R.C. CONST. pmbl., 13 and art. 5.
25. CHEN, supra note 14, at 46.
26. P.R.C. CONST., art. 2.
27. P.R.C. CONST., art. 34.
28. P.R.C. CONST., art. 97
29. P.R.C. CONST., art. 64.
30. Id.
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or the Inheritance Law. 1 The NPC Standing Committee may enact
and amend all laws except those which may only be enacted by the
NPC itself.32 Furthermore, the NPC Standing Committee can issue
supplements and amendments to the laws made by the NPC when
that body is not in session, provided that the basic principles of these
laws are not contravened.38 The State Council (Council of Minis-
ters), which is designed as an executive branch of the government,
may enact administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui) in accor-
dance with the Constitution and the law. 4 The people's congresses at
the provincial level and municipalities directly under the central gov-
ernment may adopt local regulations (difangxing fagui), provided
they do not contravene the Constitution. 5 The people's congresses of
national autonomous areas may enact autonomous regulations (zizhi
tiaoli) and specific regulations (danxing tiaoli)."
As straightforward as the above-mentioned formal hierarchy ap-
pears, the reality is, as always, much more complicated. The titles or
designations used for legislative enactments can be very confusing. A
title of an enactment can be used for regulations of different levels.
The result is that one cannot tell from the title which body enacted a
regulation or what status the regulation holds within the hierarchy of
norms.37 Even from the viewpoint of formal legality, the PRC's sys-
tem of lawmaking seems to be deficient in two major respects. First,
there exists no effective working system to deal with the problem of
inconsistencies between legal norms derived from different sources. A
formal system is outlined in the Constitution, but no procedural rules
exist. Thus, in the absence of an effective system of checks and bal-
ances, inconsistent and conflicting legislation remains in force. Sec-
ond, the limitations to the law-making powers of various legislative
authorities have not yet been worked out. There is no effective de-
lineation of the legislative responsibilities between the different legis-
lative bodies.38
31. Hayne, supra note 13, at 75.
32. P.R.C. CONST., art. 67(2).
33. P.R.C. CONST., art. 67 (3).
34. P.R.C. CONST., art. 89 (1).
35. P.R.C. CONST., art. 100.
36. P.R.C. CONST., art. 116.
37. Chen, supra note 14, at 88.
38. Id. at 90.
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3.3.3. Legal Rights and Duties
As already mentioned above, the Western idea of rights is very
different from the views held in the PRC. In the West, rights are
often regarded as natural and universal. They have not been granted
by public power and, particularly in the United States, they cannot
therefore be removed by legislation. Rights limit legislation, rather
than vice versa.39 In the PRC, rights need to be given by the state
and can therefore be taken away by the state. Law and legally de-
fined rights are subordinate to the interest of the state. Western style
constitutional guarantees of human rights and freedoms in capitalist
countries are regarded by PRC ideology as only benefiting the capi-
talists. Since the means of production and the political power are in
the hands of the capitalists and the system is one of exploitation of
the masses, the legal protection given to the workers is illusory. The
constitutional guarantee of the right to private property has been es-
pecially criticized by PRC jurists, who draw attention to the substan-
tial inequalities existing in capitalistic countries that are hidden
under a legal provision for formal equality. 40
Chapter 2 of the Constitution contains a list of legal rights and
duties. The rights provided for can be said to be comprehensive, even
by Western standards. Chinese jurisprudence classifies the rights and
freedoms provided for in chapter 2 into at least eight categories:"1
(1) the right to equality before the law; (2) political rights and free-
doms, such as electoral rights, freedom of speech, publication, assem-
bly, association, procession and demonstration, the right to lodge
complaints and charges against state organs or functionaries and the
right to compensation for infringement of citizens' rights by state
organs or functionaries; (3) religious freedom; (4) personal freedom;
(5) social and economic rights, such as the right to work and rest;
(6) cultural and educational rights, such as the right to receive edu-
cation and to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic crea-
tion, and cultural pursuits, (7) rights relating to women and the fam-
ily; (8) rights of overseas and returned Chinese people.42
39. Hayne, supra note 13, at 18.
40. CHEN, supra note 14, at 51.
41. Id. The number of rights depends on how the rights are classified.
42. P.R.C. CONST. arts. 33-50. In the CIVIL CODE, arts. 98-105, the rights of the
citizen are to some extent clarified. For instance, art. 103 of the CIVIL CODE provides
that any person has the right to choose his own spouse and art. 104 states that women
enjoy the same rights as men. General Principles of the Civil Law of the P.R.C. [CIVIL
CODE], 6th Nat'l People's Cong., 4th Sess. (effective 1987).
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The right to equality under the law carries significant importance
in the PRC due to its recent history. Since the Anti-Rightist Cam-
paign in 1957, institutionalized discrimination was practiced against
tens of millions of people due to their "class origin." Each person
was given his class origin according to his family background. Per-
sons of "bad" class origin, like landlords or rich peasants were dis-
criminated against in nearly every part of life. In criminal proceed-
ings, the law was not applied in the same way against somebody with
a "good" background. The class enemy always received harsher
sentences. This practice has been more or less eliminated since
1976.1' As opposed to earlier constitutions, new articles on protection
from arbitrary arrest, detention, and search, reflect the bitter lessons
of the Cultural Revolution era's gross violation of human rights.4
A property rights guarantee is nowhere to be found in Chapter 2.
Instead, Articles 10-13 in Chapter 1 deal with property rights. A
constitutional amendment in 1988 acknowledged the existence of pri-
vate business and granted it constitutional protection. 5 What can,
with restrictions, be called economic ownership of land has also been
protected by that amendment .4 The state protects the right of citi-
zens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and other lawful
property.4 1 This property can also be inherited.
The legal rights given to PRC citizens seem to extend to non-citi-
zens, since the PRC "protects the lawful rights and interests of for-
eigners within Chinese territory. ' 48 Foreign investment in China has
even received its own constitutional protection in article 18 which
states that foreign enterprises' "lawful rights and interests are pro-
tected by the law." However, as with many other articles in the Con-
stitution, it is very unclear what is meant exactly by those "lawful
43. CHEN, supra note 14, at 52. WOLFFHART A. VON HERRENKIRCHEN, DAS
STRAFRECHT DER VOLKSREPUBLIC CHINA UNTER BESONDERER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG
DES SOWJETISCHEN STRAFRECHTS 19-20 (1993).
44. P.R.C. CONST. arts. 37-40. While these articles are important, it must be
pointed out that these are rights of the citizens against arbitrary use of power by the
bureaucracy as opposed to protection against abuse of power by the elite. This is in line
with the Chinese tradition which allows conflict in relationships between citizens and
the bureaucracy, but less readily permits of conflict between the ruler and the ruled.
The Chinese governmental tradition is that unity and identity exist between the ruler
and the ruled. This is the very rationale for Party leadership in the first place. See
Hayne, supra note 13, at 73.
45. P.R.C. CONST. art. 10, t 4 (amended 1988).
46. P.R.C. CONST. art. 10.
47. P.R.C. CONST. art 13.
48. P.R.C. CONST. art. 32.
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rights" and "in accordance with the law" clauses.
The last few articles in chapter 2 of the Constitution state the du-
ties of the citizen. These include: "safeguarding the country's unity;
observing the law, labor discipline, public order, protecting state
property; safeguarding the security, honor and interests of the moth-
erland; performing military service; and paying taxes as required by
law." 49 The most significant of the duties is the citizen's duty, in
exercising his or her freedoms and rights, not to infringe upon the
interests of the state, of society or of the collective, or on the rights
of other citizens." This means that all the rights stated earlier in
chapter 2 are only guaranteed as long as they are in the interest of
the state.51 It should be noted too, that neither the list of rights nor
the list of duties in chapter two of the Constitution is exhaustive.5 1
4. Dispute Resolution
4.1. Different Means of Dispute Resolution
There are four types of dispute resolution in China: mediation
(xieshang), conciliation (tiaojie), arbitration (zhongcai), and court ver-
dict (panjue).51 If mediation is used, a mutually satisfactory solution
based on voluntary negotiations between the parties is attempted.
Should this first step not bring about success, conciliation can be the
next resort. The People's Conciliation Committees are one of the or-
gans used for this purpose. However, the settlement is not legally bind-
ing. If the conflict is not voluntarily solved, a choice has to be made
between arbitration or court verdict. In commercial disputes, the choice
between them has often been regulated by contract. The Chinese make
a distinction between procedures where a foreign entity is involved and
49. P.R.C. CONST. arts. 52-56 (non-American spelling used in the original
translation).
50. P.R.C. CONST. art. 51.
51. CHEN, supra note 14, at 53. This subordination of individual rights to state
interests is consistent with the Marxist tradition. The Deng regime has repeatedly
stressed that any exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms that violates any of the
"Four Basic Principles" is unconstitutional and unlawful. The four principles (keeping
to the socialist road, upholding the people's democratic dictatorship, insisting on the
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong
thought) are enshrined in the preamble to the 1982 Constitution. They were first intro-
duced by Deng Xiaoping in March 1979 as a response to the Democracy wall move-
ment of 1978-79. Id. at 53 & n.92.
52. CHEN, supra note 14, at 51.
53. Matthias Steinmann & Dunja Stadtmann Das neue chinesche Schiedsgericht-
sbarkeitsgesetz: Einfdhrung und Ubersetzung, CHINA AKTUELL, Jan. 1995, at 45.
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purely domestic arbitration. Arbitration involving foreigners is done by
the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
(CIETAC) and the China Maritime Arbitration Commission
(CMAC). A choice between Chinese and other arbitration institutes
has also often been regulated by contract between the parties. If court
is chosen, the dispute will normally be taken to the appropriate division
of the People's Court.
Informal solutions to resolve conflicts have a long tradition in
China. This is explained by the interplay of Confucian values and the
unattractiveness of the imperial court system.54 Disputes within the
family clan were solved by the families themselves. Even outside the
family circle, court disputes were avoided. To bring a dispute to court
was seen as a failure for the family bringing the suit. It disrupted the
harmony. Indeed, for that very reason, government officials in Imperial
China are said to have discouraged litigation by imposing penalties on
those bringing a lawsuit.5 5 The legal system has in all times been
viewed with suspicion by the people. The people's idea of the law was
that of criminal law only. To this day, particularly among the rural
population, the overwhelming view is that law is not a means to enforce
legal rights. Rather, law is a tool of the state to control and punish the
people.
However, since 1978, the conciliation committees, which can be
divided into neighborhood, work unit and village committees, have de-
clined in popularity, particularly in the major cities. There are a num-
ber of reasons for this. The government has been promoting law as a
valued means of modernization and people see courts more and more as
an alternative. Furthermore, informal neighborhood justice is increas-
ingly associated with the lawlessness of the Cultural Revolution when it
became a tool for oppression. In addition, the committees have received
a reputation for incompetence.5 6
54. Rob Jagtenberg & Annie de Roo, Dispute settlement in China: Law or pol-
icy?, in ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN CHINA SINCE 1978, 27, 30 (Dong Lisheng ed.
1994).
55. Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially Em-
bedded factors in the Transformation from Hierarchy to Market 1978-1989, 5 JOUR-
NAL OF CHINESE LAW 143, 160 (1991).
56. Jagtenberg & de Roo, supra note 54, at 35. The committees are also an inte-
grated part of the local system of public control and supervise a range of activities,
including family planning and housekeeping chores that in other societies might be
considered private concerns. In some urban communities, these committees are heavily
identified with the elderly women who dominate the inhabitants with a maternalistic or
officious (depending on your perspective) style of intervention in other people's
problems. See Cheng & Rosett, supra note 55, at 198.
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4.2. Court System
The "People's Courts" of the PRC are the judicial organs of the
state.57 The courts are organized in four levels. At the top is the Su-
preme People's Court, followed by a provincial level, a regional level,
and a local level. There is a High People's Court at each provincial
level, including in the municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and
autonomous regions. At the regional level there is an Intermediate Peo-
ple's Court and at the local level there is a Basic People's Court. Each
court is further divided into four divisions: civil, criminal, economic and
administrative. There are also special courts that deal with military,
shipping, railroads, etc. The lower courts are supervised by the higher
courts and each court has a so-called "adjudication committee," which
reviews cases or bodies of decisions to help formulate internal guidance
to the courts. Normally, cases are decided by a panel of judges, some-
times consisting of one judge and two laymen.5 8 Trials are normally
open to the public.59
The President of the Supreme People's Court is elected by the
NPC, which also has the power to remove the same.8 0 The other judges
on the court are appointed by the Standing Committee of the NPC.
The term of office is limited. The People's congresses at the local level
can appoint and remove local judges following the same pattern as on
the national level.
China should be regarded as a statutory law country, but even this
type of legal system relies on precedents. Many of the cases that leave
the court of origin are distributed through internal channels and the
judgments are not published. Since 1985, the PRC has published se-
lected cases from the Supreme Court in the Gazette of the Supreme
Court. It is unclear if these published decisions have the force of prece-
dent or are used for general guidance only. The cases in the Gazette
are cases from lower courts as the Supreme Court seldom tries cases
itself. The Supreme Court does not simply publish the lower court's
judgments. Instead, the Court might substantially edit and rewrite the
cases. This liberal editing power, of course, provides the Court with an
opportunity to channel its own opinions and positions to the lower
57. P.R.C. CONST. art. 123.
58. Ronald C. Brown, The Role of the Legal Environment in Doing Business in
the People's Republic of China, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN CHINA 62, 68-69 (Lane
Kelley & Oded Shenkar, eds. 1993).
59. P.R.C. CONST. art. 125.
60. P.R.C. CONST. arts. 62(7), 63(4).
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courts.61 Furthermore, the Chinese judges are not trained nor are they
required to write court opinions that show the legal reasoning of the
court. Thus, even if court judgments were published, these decisions
would state the facts of the case and the judgment, but little or no legal
reasoning. The lack of guiding case law is problematic for the Chinese
legal system. Given China's size and population and the general phras-
ing of the laws, implementation of the regulations differs widely from
place to place. Therefore, a substantial case law with legal reasoning is
urgently needed to create uniformity in court judgments.
4.3. The Legal Workforce
The legal workforce is of shifting quality in the PRC today. Many
people with legal training were either killed, imprisoned, removed from
office, or chose not to practice law after the foundation of the PRC in
1949. During the first few years of the PRC, a serious effort was made
to build a legal system, which was reflected in the 1954 Constitution.
However, with the Anti-Rightist campaigns in the latter half of the
1950s, legality deteriorated. Many judges, scholars and other legal per-
sonnel were banished from their professions. The law schools were
closed between 1957-58 and the Justice ministry itself was closed in
1959. The already weak legal system with increasingly less proficient
legal personnel was completely destroyed during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Judges and lawyers had knowledge of the old system and were
therefore considered both useless for, and dangerous to the Revolution.
Consequently, the legal workers were among the first to be sent to the
countryside to receive re-education from the peasants.6" The law
schools were closed again in 1966 and it was not until 1977 that they
reopened. In 1981, the first students were graduated from the resur-
rected law schools.63
China had sent its legal force into exile, dismantled the legal sys-
tem and did not produce any law graduates for 15 years. When sanity
returned to Beijing in the late 1970s and a legal system was reinstated,
there was a severe shortage of trained legal personnel. Legal workers
brought back from exile helped to fill the gap to some extent, but a
61. Lu Nanping, Legal Precedents with Chinese Characteristics: Published Cases
in the Gazette of the Supreme People's Court, 5 JOURNAL OF CHINESE LAW 107, 114
(1991).
62. Xi-Ching Gao, Today's Legal Thinking and Its Economic Impact in China,
52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 99 (1989).
63. Henry R. Zheng, The Evolving Role of Lawyers and Legal Practice in China,
36 AM. J. COMp. L. 473, 488 (1988). Beijing University alone opened its law faculty in
1974 and therefore a small number graduated from there in 1978.
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large number of retired soldiers were assigned to work in the legal sec-
tor in order to fill the vacant positions. This meant that a significant
part of the legal system was filled with people with little or no legal
training. Large on-the-job training programs were established to edu-
cate this personnel. Even as these latter members of the legal profes-
sion are being phased out of the legal system in the 1990s, many re-
main. Since 1986, entrance into the profession has been by
standardized examination. Today, an applicant does not need to have a
law school diploma to be admitted to the bar according to the Regula-
tions on Lawyers." Other "legal training" is also allowed.
5. The Rule Of Law In The PRC
5.1. Introduction
The rule of law can be defined as a principle of government that
all persons, bodies and the government itself are equal before, and an-
swerable to, the law, and that no person shall be punished without a
trial. The Chinese expression for the Rule of Law is fazhi. However,
China has no tradition of the rule of law like or similar to the above
definition. The law in China may be considered as first and foremost an
instrument of state power, and only secondly as a safeguard. Twenty
centuries of Imperial justice have not been conducive for the Chinese to
accustom themselves to thinking in terms of rights. The rule of law did
not mean protection of the individual, but expansion of state power and
keeping discipline among the people.65 The Communist party is, like
the emperors who once ruled China, omnipotent and above the law.
There are no solid guarantees for fairness and equity in business deal-
ings, security of property, or protection of human rights. Because the
Communist party will not tolerate free speech, free press or political
opposition, let alone submit itself to the test of free and fair elections,
there can be none of the checks and balances these forces provide in a
more liberal society.66
Although the above painted picture of the rule of law in PRC is
rather bleak, there are positive signs. China has changed tremendously
since the end of the Mao era. While still being an oppressive state, the
party dictatorship today is very different from the blind terror exercised
during the Cultural Revolution. The current Chinese leadership real-
izes that a modern commercial and economic law is instrumental in
64. Id.
65. Jagtenberg & de Roo, supra note 54, at 55.
66. Survey: China, THE ECONOMIST (INT'L EDITION), Mar. 18, 1995, at 4.
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establishing a stable base for its continued economic development. 67
Due to the regime's emphasis on reform, many laws have been enacted.
Although enforcement may still be weak, the legal system is clearly
gaining ground in China.
5.2. The Independence of the Courts
Within a genuine socialist legal system, it is evident that the judi-
ciary cannot be granted independence in the same way as in the West.
The state embodies the will of the proletariat, and courts are
subordinate to the highest organs of state power.68 Officially, the high-
est power in China is exercised by the NPC. This organ not only makes
the laws but its Standing Committee has been given the power to inter-
pret the Constitution. Thus, the power to interpret the constitutionality
of laws is vested in the chief legislative organ itself.
Although there is no separation of powers, a certain degree of spe-
cialization does exist. According to article 126 of the Constitution, the
courts exercise judicial power independently and are not subject to in-
terference by any administrative organ, public organization or individ-
ual. Theoretically, the courts are therefore independent from all other
organs excluding the NPC. In reality, the courts are weak institutions
under heavy influence from party and regional interests. Most of the
laws are issued by the central government, but interpretation and en-
forcement of these regulations are local. Courts are often partial to lo-
cal interests since the judges, who are often little more than petty func-
tionaries, are frequently bowing to the wishes of the powerful
bureaucrats. 69 This system creates a situation where people from other
regions, not to mention foreigners, can face tremendous difficulties in
acquiring and enforcing verdicts that will not favor local interests. Civil
disputes are sometimes transformed into criminal offenses by courts in
order to detain people and apply pressure on them or their companies
to pay another party. 70 Furthermore, local officials have been reported
to use their own forces instead of the courts to settle lawsuits. Even if
the courts wished to end this type of unlawful self-help, ithe manpower
available to the officials breaking the law is often superior to that of the
67. Carl Goldstein, Ailing Legal System, CHINA IN TRANSITION 29, 29 (Frank
Ching, ed.,1994).
68. Jagtenberg & de Roo, supra note 54, at 55.
69. Goldstein, supra note 57, at 30.
70. See FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Apr. 6, 1995, at 22,; see also Susan
Finder, Inside the People's Courts: China's Litigation System and the Resolution of
Commercial Disputes, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, Feb. 1996, at 16, 20.
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courts. As a result, the authority of the courts is severely undermined. 1
The central government is aware of the regional protectionism and is
working to strengthen the legal branch of government. However, since
the strength of the regions is growing, it has become harder to enforce
the will of the central government than at any other time since the
revolution. It will take a long time before the courts, especially outside
the biggest metropolitan areas, can be relied on as competent, powerful
and impartial decision-makers.
5.3. Law and Policy 72
While legal reform has strong momentum in China, the current
regime's view on justice is discouraging. There exists a formalistic reli-
ance on institutions and procedures without regard for substantive jus-
tice. For instance, power abuses are not regarded as wrong due to the
injustice inflicted on a party, but rather because the abuses deviate
from regime policies.7 3 In other words, it is not as important for an
action to be just as it is for the action to be in line with Party policy.
Regime policies change with time; that is the nature of government.
One of the principal functions of law is to provide stable playing rules
within which the government policies must act. In a legal system where
policy is regarded as more important than law, there can be no true
rule of law.
III. PROPERTY LAW
6. Property Theory
6.1 Introduction
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagina-
tion, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of
property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right or any other individual in the universe.
-WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
All societies impose at least some limitations on what may be
71. Finder, supra note 70, at 20.
72. See also section 4.2 infra on law and policy.
73. Pitman B. Potter, Riding the Tiger: Legitimacy and Legal Culture in Post-
Mao China, 138 CHINA QUARTERLY 325, 329 (1994).
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owned privately and on what may be the proper use or disposition of
private property. Even a man who always claims exclusive rights, can
rarely exercise those rights in total exclusion of any other. Ownership
rights are seldom absolute. Many things, such as dwellings, cannot be
used or transferred without having any restrictions at all placed on
them. Instead of absolute rights, ownership should be seen as a bundle
of rights held by the property owner. Therefore, the question of control
over property becomes one of degree of ownership. Acceptable degrees
of ownership are in turn enforced through a legal system.
In a socialist society, the level of permissible private ownership is
lower than that in a capitalist society. In communist theory, the control
of property has long been viewed as the key to success of the socialist
revolution. To create a socialist society and give this order an economic
power base, Marx meant that all means of production had to be con-
trolled by the state. Private ownership of these means had to be abol-
ished. This would deprive the exploiting capitalists of their powerbase
and bring the working class to power. Public ownership is viewed as
vital to assure that the means of production will be used for the good of
many instead of the enrichment of a few.
In line with Marxist theory, the industries in the urban areas as
well as the arable land in China were all confiscated during the 1950s.
The state created huge state enterprises that became small societies in
their own right, caring for food allowances, health care, housing,
schools and the retired workers. In the countryside, the government
created collectives of the villages and then, in turn, integrated the col-
lectives into huge people's communes comprised of approximately some
5000 households each. These mammoth units (danwei) made sense
from a communist ideological standpoint, but they often did not make
economical sense.
Realizing that a centrally-planned, state-run economy was not
leading to economic prosperity, the Deng government changed course
and began to allow a degree of private ownership in 1978. The com-
mune system was abolished and the land was contracted out to the
farmers. The state encouraged small scale, light industry operated by
collectives in the rural areas. In the cities, small private enterprises in
manufacturing and services were encouraged. As the economy grew,
large privately-run companies appeared. These firms employed many
people and the owners did not themselves engage in labor. Such people
looked very much like capitalists. As China was on its way to being
transformed into a capitalistic society, it became harder theoretically to
justify communist rule and the power monopoly exercised by the CCP.
This problem was solved by arguing that China was still in the "pri-
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mary stage of socialism" (shehuizhuyi chuji jieduan).7" According to
this theory, the Chinese society had bypassed an essential stage of eco-
nomic order by going directly from a feudal peasant society to a social-
ist society. To reach the goal of a real communistic society where the
state eventually would wither away, a stage of market economy had to
be experienced. This primary stage is expected to last one hundred
years from the 1950s. Public ownership plays the dominant role even
during this phase of development, but private ownership is also permis-
sible. It is acknowledged that the private sector of the economy involves
wage labor and this will lead to unequal income, but this is tolerated
since the private sector provides employment and helps meet people's
needs. Moreover, Chinese theorists argue that private enterprise in
China is meant to be different from private enterprise elsewhere (i.e.,
capitalist societies) because it developed long after China's socialist
transformation. The public sector clearly occupies the dominant posi-
tion in the economy and the owners of private enterprise are expected
to use most of their profits in expanding production instead of using it
for personal consumption. 5
The "primary stage" theory provides an ideological justification,
however weak, for the permittance of private ownership of property and
the development of private business in the Chinese socialist society. Le-
gal protection for private business was given in a 1988 constitutional
amendment article 11 not long after the launch of this theory.76
6.2. Concept of Property
The Chinese word for property is caichan, which includes both
tangible and intangible property."7 The latter includes intellectual prop-
erty rights such as patents, trademarks, copyrights and any other scien-
tific or intellectual achievements.78
Tangible property is by Chinese jurisprudence divided into specific
property (tedingwu) and class property (zhongleiwu) .7 The former re-
fers to identifiable items such as a painting or a building, and the latter
74. Allison W. Conner, To Get Rich is Precarious: Regulation of Private Enter-
prise in the P.R.C., 5 J. OF CHINESE L. 1, 14 n.66 (1991). The "primary stage" theory
was first launched by the then CCP general secretary Zhao Ziyang in a speech to the
CCP Thirteenth National Congress in October 1987. Id.
75. Id. at 14.
76. See section 7.4 infra.
77. See MINFA DA CIDIAN 97-98, 343, supra note 5.
78. Id.
79. MINFA XUE [STUDIES IN CIVIL LAW] 90, 94 (Zhang Li & Wang Zuotang
eds., 1994).
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refers to property that has common characteristics and can be mea-
sured and determined by quantities or types, such as rice. When a
piece of class property is separated from its class, it becomes identifi-
able and is then considered specific property. There are mainly three
areas where this distinction has legal effect. First, if a contract is made
to use specific property, the same piece of property must be returned,
but if class property such as rice is used, it is sufficient to return the
same kind of product of identical quantity and quality. Second, if spe-
cific property is destroyed prior to delivery, the seller is relieved of his
duty to perform, but in the case of class property, the seller is not re-
lieved of the same obligation since the delivery can be replaced by a
new shipment. Third, specific property is transferred when the contract
is entered into, whereas class property is transferred when the goods
are actually delivered. This last distinction has lost its relevance after
the promulgation of the General Principles of Civil Law 0 (colloquially
known as the Civil Code) in 1987. The new law provides a uniform rule
in article 72 that governs transfer of both types of property. Under this
article, property is transferred when the goods are delivered unless the
parties have stipulated otherwise.8"
As with most other legal systems, Chinese jurisprudence differenti-
ates between movable and immovable property. The latter, which can-
not be removed, is real property. To transfer real property, or land-use
rights, a registration procedure has to be followed. A registration of
movable property is only required when vehicles, ships, airplanes and
securities are involved.8 2
Another distinction made in Chinese jurisprudence is between sev-
erable and unseverable property. The former refers to property that can
be divided without changing the intended utility or harming the ex-
pected use of the thing, like a shipment of grain. Unseverable proper-
ties are things that cannot be divided without changing the intended
utility or harming the use, like a horse. This distinction is not only of
theoretical value. Severable property may be divided among different
owners, but unseverable property may only be given to one owner and
the rest will have to accept monetary compensation. When co-owned
unseverable property is subject to debt, the owners are jointly liable for
80. See CIVIL CODE, supra note 42.
81. The parties may regulate their own relation in a contract, but not third party
rights. The CIVIL CODE is silent on when a buyer of property gains protection from the
seller's creditors.
82. Secured Interests Law of the P.R.C., arts. 41-43, 8th Nat'l People's Cong.,
14th Sess. (1995). Nationwide real estate mortgage and chattel registration systems
are provided for in this law.
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the debt, which would not be the case if the property could be
divided.83
Other classifications include the distinction between the main
property (e.g. lock) and subordinated property (e.g. key) and between
the original property (e.g. tree) and accrued property (e.g. fruit). Un-
less law or contract provides otherwise, the rule is that subordinated or
accrued property is transferred when the main or original property is
transferred.84
The classifications above have been stated in Chinese jurispru-
dence. Other classifications of property can be found in statutory law,
which divides property into (1) state property, (2) collective property
and (3) individual or private entity property.85 This classification was
inherited from Soviet legal thinking and is increasingly criticized by
Chinese legal scholars for its impracticality.
Property is protected by articles in the Constitution and the Civil
Code.86 However, the wording is different depending on whether the
property is state, collective or individually owned. State property is "sa-
cred and inviolable" 87 whereas collectiye property and "lawful prop-
erty" of citizens are simply protected by, law.88 Apparently, state prop-
erty is given a higher legal status than collective and individual
property. It follows that if a dispute involves individual property, the
first question is whether the ownership itself is lawful. For state prop-
erty, there seems to be a presumption of lawfulness. This distinction
may have significant implications when the property interests of the
state, collectives and individuals are in conflict. Even so, the practical
difference between these provisions is not so great, as the basic princi-
ple of the Civil Code is that all civil law subjects, including state insti-
tutions and citizens, enjoy equal status in civil activities. 89
83. STUDIES IN CIVIL LAW, supra note 79.
84. Id.
85. P.R.C. CONST., arts. 5, 7-10.
86. Property rights are also dealt with in the Criminal Code. The Criminal Code
states in its general provisions (art. 2) that it protects citizens' ownership rights to their
lawful property. Art. 31 of the Criminal Code states that those whose criminal acts
cause economic loss to persons will be required, according to the circumstances, to
make compensation for said loss in addition to criminal punishment. Criminal Law of
the P.R.C. [CRIMINAL CODE], arts. 2, 31, 5th Nat'l People's Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
87. P.R.C. CONST., art. 12 and CIVIL CODE, art. 73.
88. P.R.C. CONST., art. 13 and CIVIL CODE, art. 74-75.
89. CIVIL CODE, art. 3, 5.
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6.3. Ownership
The definition of ownership (suoyouquan) is found in article 71 of
the Civil Code: "Ownership means an owner's right in accordance with
law to possess, use, benefit from and dispose of his own property."
This division of property rights is different from the typical west-
ern civil codes rooted in Roman law. Roman law distinguished between
ownership (dominium) and property rights without ownership, such as
possession, easements, and usufruct. The Roman system formed the ba-
sis for the formal classifications of property rights in 1804 for the
French Code Civil and, more completely, in 1896 for the German civil
code (the BGB). Even before the BGB was promulgated in 1900, the
Japanese had put a more or less virtual carbon copy of it into effect in
1898. The Japanese Civil Code, in turn, influenced the Republic of
China (ROC). The ROC's Civil Code, published between 1929 and
1931, acquired its terminology for the classification of property rights
from its Japanese and German counterparts. Like the BGB and the
Japanese Civil Code, book 3 of the ROC's Civil Code is titled "Rights
in Things" (wuquan) 0 and deals with ownership, possession, ease-
ments, liens, and mortgages as well as related matters such as joint
ownership and registration of rights."1
The ROC's Civil Code was abolished on mainland China along
with all other ROC laws by the communists in 1949, because the bour-
geois laws were regarded as having no place in the new socialist repub-
lic. Drafting of a PRC Civil Code began in the 1950s but was never
completed. In spite of the civil code never having been put into effect, it
was influential as laterdate Chinese legal textbooks were often based on
its thinking. 9 2 The acute need for a statutory property rights system
became evident after the economic reforms began in 1978. To satisfy
this need, the government promulgated the Civil Code on January 1,
1987.93
As stated in article 71 of the Civil Code, the Chinese concept of
90. The German term is Sachenrecht and the Japanese term is Bukken.
91. Edward J. Epstein, The Theoretical System of Property Rights in China's
General Principles of Civil Law: Theoretical Controversy in the Drafting Process and
Beyond, 52 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 176, 183 (1989).
92. Id. at 181.
93. See CIVIL CODE, supra note 42. Chinese legal scholars do not like to call the
General Principles of Civil Law a civil code, because they want to reserve that name
for a more comprehensive CIVIL CODE in the future. However, since the law is a civil
code, albeit short and incomplete, most Western legal scholars call it the "Civil Code."
Interview with Wang Weiguo, Professor of Law, Chinese University of Politics and
Law, Beijing, P.R.C. (July 8, 1995).
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property ownership is divided into four constituent "powers and func-
tions"(quanneng): Possession (zhanyou), use (shiyong), the right to
benefit (shouyiquan)9 4 and disposition (chufen).5 These four powers
and functions of ownership can be distilled from ownership individually
or in combination. The reason for breaking down ownership into four
constituent parts is that legal theorists can build new rights with novel
combinations of the old parts. This might be described as a process of
borrowing bourgeois theoretical tools to produce new "socialist" legal
concepts. 96 Although property rights in the Civil Code might be classi-
fied differently, a closer look at the ownership system reveals that even
Chinese civil law has its roots in the Roman legal tradition.
Textbook authors argue that in addition to ownership rights them-
selves, five other property rights can be found in chapter 5, section 1 of
the Civil Code. These are:
(1) The right of state-owned or collective units to "use and ben-
efit from" land owned by the state [art. 80(1)] or things on the
land owned by the state [art. 81(1)];
(2) The right, acquired by contract, of citizens or collectives to
operate publicly owned land [art. 80(2)] and things on the land
[art. 81(3)];
(3) The right of the state or collective units or citizens to ex-
ploit natural resources [art. 81(2)];
(4) The right of an enterprise owned by the whole people (i.e.,
state-owned enterprise) to operate property given to it by the
state [art. 82]; and
(5) Limitation of property rights necessary for the conduct of
"neighborhood relationships" [art. 83].11
These rights can be classified as "rights in things" in the sense of
the German BGB and the later denounced ROC Civil Code. The first
right above can be described as a usufruct (yongyiquan); the second
right is another kind of usufruct, called a contract usufruct. The third
94. "The right to benefit" was added to legal textbooks in the 1980s. Possession or
use do not seem to be prerequisites to enjoying the right to benefit. This allows for the
enjoyment of unearned income, which was not permitted according to earlier textbooks
and CCP theory. In the 1950s, the right to benefit was regarded as a disguise for the
exploiting classes' extraction of blood and sweat from the workers and consequently
denounced. Current textbooks give such examples of right to benefit as interest from
savings and eggs from a chicken. Epstein, supra note 91 at 185 n.26.
95. Id. at 185.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 188.
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right, the right to exploit resources (caikuang quan) is more problem-
atic when viewed from a strictly Western view of usufruct. In Roman
law, a usufruct could not be consumed. This was solved by allowing the
usufructary to be the owner of the fungible goods with a duty to restore
the equivalent amount to the original owner. This solution is, however,
not acceptable to Chinese Civil Law, since natural resources belong to
the state 8 and the land on which the resources stand is non-transfera-
ble. Chinese law solves this problem by allowing exploitation of natural
resources for a fee. Since it is not the fruits of the land that are taken,
but parts of the actual land itself, it seems as if the state is effectively
transferring ownership. The fourth right, the right to operate, is also a
form of usufruct. Neighborhood rights, the fifth civil right listed above,
are property rights only in the sense that they limit the exercise of
property rights by the owner or occupier of the immovable property.99
Another property right found in Western civil codes is the right to
pledge property. This right can be found in the Civil Code, but not
with the rest of the property rights. Instead it can be found under chap-
ter 5, section 2, which deals with obligations. 100
The Civil Code's property system has begun to move away from
the Soviet-inspired division of property rights into state, collective and
private. However, the Civil Code's system is still crude and needs either
to be changed or supplemented by other laws. A new property law is
currently being discussed in China. So far, very rough drafts of this law
reveal regulation that closely follows the German system of property
rights. 10 1 The study group responsible for the drafting of a property law
published an outline of the law in Faxue Yanjiu (Studies in Law), No.
3, 1995. °
Different categories of property rights (rights in things). 103
Chapter I General Provisions
Chapter II Ownership (suo you quan)
1. General Provisions
98. P.R.C. CONST., art. 9.
99. Epstein, supra note 91, at 191.
100. CIVIL CODE, supra note 42, art. 89(2).
101. See DAS BORGERLICHEs GESETZBUCH [BGB] Drittes Buch, Sachenrecht
§§ 854-1296.
102. The Essential Train of Thought for the Formulation of the Law of Real
Property (translated from the Chinese), Faxue Yanjiu [STUDIES IN LAW], No. 3, 1995,
at 8-10.
103. The Chinese term is wuquan zhong lei. In German, the title of the outline
would be called Verschiedene Sachenrechten. Chinese legal terms tend to be closer to
German terminology than Anglo-American due to the influence of the BGB.
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2. Ownership of Immovable Property (budong chan suo
you quan)
3. Chattel Ownership (dong chan suo you quan)
4. Joint Ownership (gong you)
Chapter III Land-use Rights (fang jidi shiyong quan)
Chapter IV Right to Use Farmland (for farming only) (Nongdi
shiyong quan)
Chapter V Easement (diyi quan)
Chapter VI Mortgage Rights (diya quan)
1. General Provisions
2. Mortgage with Limits of Obligation (zuigaoe diya)
3. Floating Charge"" (dong chan diya)
4. Enterprise Securities Mortgage 10 5 (qiye caichan fi he
diya)
Chapter VII Lien Rights (zhi quan)
1. General Provisions
2. Chattel Lien (dong chanquan)
3. Lien on Rights (quanli zhi)
Chapter VIII Right of Retention 0 6 (liu zhi quan)
Chapter IX Possession (zhan you)
Chapter X Supplementary Provisions
Since this proposed outline is a rough draft only, it is not certain
that it will become law or that the end product will mirror this outline.
However, given the current momentum for legal reform in China, it
seems likely that a new property law will be passed within the next few
years. This will mean a departure from the property system drawn up
in the Constitution. The general strategy for legal reform among the
legal scholars is more or less to ignore the Constitution when drafting
new laws. When the reformed legal system is in place, the Constitution
will be a "dead letter" and can be replaced with a new one that more
closely resembles Western notions of a constitution. Whether or not the
legal scholars and their technocrat allies are able successfully to ac-
complish these reforms remains to be seen.
104. "Floating charge" is British English. This resembles a blanket lien in Ameri-
can terminology. Everything in the company is subject to the lien, even the real estate,
although a special mortgage on a particular piece of real estate would have a senior
right to that real estate over the blanket mortgage. In Swedish law, the right is called
Fi6retagshypotek.
105. This also resembles a blanket mortgage. See supra note 104.
106. In the BGB, this right is called Retentionsrecht. Another English word is
possessory lien.
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A controversial suggestion in the Faxue Yanjiu article is that the
farmers are given a real right to the land. Today, the household respon-
sibility system (see section 11) only gives the farmers a contractual
land use right. The authors argue that the farmers' rights are not suffi-
ciently protected today and anything less than a real ownership is un-
satisfactory. This is very sensitive because ever since the revolution,
land cannot be owned by anyone other than the state or the collectives.
To allow full land ownership could in the long run create a land-owner
class, which is unacceptable to the CCP.
IV. PERSONAL PROPERTY ("MOVABLES")
7. Different Types of Personal Property Rights
7.1. Definition
In this article, personal property is defined as all movable prop-
erty, except for property which has become a part of real property,
such as a door or a fence. Real Property is defined as land and rights in
land, for example land-use rights.
7.2. State Ownership (Ownership by the Whole People)
The Constitution states that the basis of the PRC socialist eco-
nomic system is socialist public ownership of the means of production.
The public ownership is divided between the state and the collectives
and this property is sacred and inviolable. 10 7 The state-owned sector, or
the part of the public sector owned by the people as a whole, is the
leading force in the national economy.1"8 Heavy industry and so called
"strategic industries," such as weaponry, telecommunications and
mass-media are reserved areas of the state. The private sector is al-
lowed to act in certain fields of the light industry and in the service
sector, but is only to be seen as a complement to the state-owned
sector.109
During the 1950s, all land and practically all industry were confis-
cated by the PRC government, which either kept the property or redis-
tributed it to the collectives. Therefore by the mid-1950s, all land was
either owned by the state or the collectives. (Real property is discussed
107. P.R.C. CONST., art. 12. See also CIVIL CODE, supra note 42, art. 73.
108. P.R.C. CONST., art. 7 (as amended 1993). The ownership by the whole peo-
ple was changed to the ownership by the people as a whole. Any change in meaning
does not seem to have been achieved by modifying the wording.
109. P.R.C. CONsT., art. 11 (as amended 1988).
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in section V below.) The government created state-owned companies
(SOEs) where the seized company's assets were placed. The number
and size of the SOEs grew rapidly as China industrialized. Following
the Soviet lead, giant steel mills and other heavy industries were built.
Furthermore, many of these SOEs were put far inland to protect them
from feared attacks by the United States and later, the Soviet Union.
Whole industries were either moved or built anew deep in the interior.
The problem with this "third line"11 was that it not only placed these
industries far from perceived enemies but also quite a far distance
away from consumers and necessary raw materials.
Today, there are about 100,000 SOEs in the PRC.111 Many are
small to medium cities in their own right, operating their own schools,
universities, hospitals, police, banks, shops and housing for the em-
ployed. These companies are responsible for taking care of their em-
ployees even after retirement. Until a few years ago, the company jobs
could even be inherited by the workers' children. Many of the SOEs
are inefficient and often produce goods that have no market. About half
of the SOEs are losing money and have to be bailed out by government
subsidies. This puts a severe strain on the government budget" 2 and
fuels inflation, which is running at an annual rate of 25 percent. Since
the state sector consumes such a large amount of funds, less capital is
available for other more efficient township and private companies that
would provide better investment returns. Furthermore, the SOEs have
a monopoly on many parts of the economy. These monopolies are al-
most always highly inefficient and therefore costly to the economy as a
whole.
An obvious solution to these problems would be to put the hopeless
110. The third line was Mao's idea. He was inspired by the Soviet Union's hasty
move in 1941 of part of its industry behind the Ural mountains away from the advanc-
ing German forces. Learning from that event, Mao wanted to be prepared for the
awaited war with the United States. He ordered industries to move to parts of China
where practically no infrastructure existed. The army was used to build railroads in
these remote areas. The Sichuan and Yunnan provinces therefore got their railroads,
but at a very high cost. The third line project, which in its first years were led by Deng
Xiaoping, continued using up large amounts of capital until the 1970s. HARRISON E.
SALISBURY, THE NEW EMPERORS 124-33 (1992).
111. The numbers tend to fluctuate depending on who states the numbers and on
what criteria they have relied for their computations. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC RE-
VIEW set the number at 108,000 SOEs. Nayan Chanda, Asia's State Enterprises, FAR
EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Feb. 23, 1993 at 48. CHINA DAILY put the figure at
70,000. CHINA DAILY, Apr. 6, 1995.
112. The subsidies to the SOEs amount to 60 percent of the P.R.C. budget deficit.
FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Feb. 23, 1995.
1996]
30 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 20
cases into bankruptcy, restructure and privatize the other SOEs, or ab-
sent total privatization, turn them into stock companies so they could
use the stock market to raise capital and be less dependent on the state.
The painful conventional wisdom of any market economy is well known
by the Chinese leadership, but they are afraid to take action due to the
destabilizing effects on society. China passed a bankruptcy law in
1988,113 but so far few companies have been forced into bankruptcy.
Both serious restructuring and bankruptcy would mean massive layoffs
running into tens of millions of employees. 1 4 To restructure all compa-
nies more or less at once using an Eastern European style shock ther-
apy would most certainly create social unrest in many areas. This is
what the central government fears the most.
The problems are not limited to the workforce. State banks have
given loans amounting to hundreds of billions of Yuan, so called "pol-
icy loans.1 115 Furthermore, the SOEs themselves are locked into trian-
gular debt, which is what the SOEs owe each other. "A" cannot pay
"B," therefore "B" cannot pay "C" and so on. Since an SOE's
problems are linked to the banks, the local governments and other
SOEs together, it is hard to take limited reform action. If the govern-
ment wants to restructure ten companies, the debt chain will lead them
to another fifty and so forth. Many SOEs are totally dependent on gov-
ernment loans to pay salaries and other operating expenses. The loans
cannot therefore be used for investments but only for consumption to
keep the companies afloat.
Privatization of these companies is not without serious drawbacks
either. Many of the companies have large and costly obligations to
their employees and the plants themselves are often both outdated and
113. A new Bankruptcy Law has been drafted and will probably be passed by the
National People's Congress in 1996. According to one of the drafters, the new law will
be a more practical document that fills the needs of a market economy. The new law
has been influenced by the American Bankruptcy code and will have a company protec-
tion and restructuring system resembling the American Code's famous Chapter 11.
Interview with Wang Weiguo, Professor of Law, Chinese University of Politics and
Law, Beijing, P.R.C. (July 8, 1995).
114. The SOEs together employ some 110 million people. If dependents are
counted, the SOEs provide livelihood for a quarter of China's population. FAR EASTERN
ECONOMIC REVIEW, Feb. 23, 1995. Another problem with closing down companies is
that many of the worst cases are in the backward Chinese hinterland. Since these re-
gions are so far behind the booming coastal areas, the bankruptcy option is even more
undesirable. Id. at 52.
115. The credit extended to an ailing SOE is called a "policy loan" since it is not
given on commercial terms. In many cases, the loans are government handouts that the
banks do not expect to get back. Henry Sender, Political Loans?, in CHINA IN TP.ANSI-
TION, supra note 67, at 56-57.
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poorly maintained. Therefore, private companies might not be inter-
ested in investing in these SOEs. Still, there are many SOEs that could
be privatized. For the latter companies, the privatization hurdles are
not economical, but ideological. According to Marxist ideology, means
of production has to be owned by the state to give it an economic
powerbase. If the state sells off its assets, what is the basis and justifi-
cation for the CCP power monopoly?
It is against this backdrop that the property rights problems of
SOEs should be considered. The companies are owned by the state but
there is a rather ambiguous ownership definition. Who is responsible
for the companies? The government? What branch of the government?
What level of government is responsible? Who runs everyday business
and what autonomy do the managers have?
The SOE property rights problem has been intensively discussed in
Chinese periodicals and newspapers since the late 1980s.111 What gov-
ernment department should be responsible for a certain company can
be a problem since companies are often owned by a mixture of state,
local government bodies and even the military.117 The thorniest issue is
the autonomy of the SOE itself. The debate is about how to define and
realize enterprise autonomy in a socialist market economy. Enterprise
autonomy should mean that the enterprise is able not only to resist
interference from state administration organs in its production and
commercial activities, but also to use state property as responsibly as
an entrepreneur would use his own.
Realizing these problems, the government has tried to increase the
SOE managers' responsibility with the introduction of management
contracts and the creation of the 1984 factory-manager responsibility
system. To a large extent, these reforms have not achieved their aim to
separate business and politics. The ownership problem remains. In the
West, large companies are normally not run by the owners directly.
The owners have appointed a company board that runs the operation
through a chief executive officer. In China, the State tends to interfere
in the day to day operations of the SOEs.11 Constant owner interfer-
116. For a closer look at the ownership debate in China, see Jianfu Chen, Securi-
tization of State-Owned Enterprises and Ownership Controversy in the P.R.C., 15 THE
SYDNEY LAW REVIEW 59-84 (1993).
117. An example of the complicated ownership structure is China Jialing Group,
a producer of car parts in Sichuan province. The company has ten factories, each
owned by different combinations of provincial and local governments and the military.
See China Stirs Its Sleeping Giants, THE ECONOMIST (INT'L EDITION), Aug. 27, 1994
at 54.
118. To be fair, China is hardly the only country where the State has been inter-
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ence makes the companies harder to operate. Furthermore, the com-
pany's resources are not necessarily the exclusive property of the firm.
A Western judge could without hesitation declare that the capital is
the property of the corporation since the widely held view in the West
is that the property of the company differs from the property of its
investors. The investors have a stake in the company equity but cannot
exercise direct ownership over the company assets. In China, this is not
clear. The SOEs are legal entities but the state still seems to have a
direct ownership over the company assets.
The property rights situation is confusing. The party and govern-
ment interference with the management of the SOEs is damaging effi-
ciency. So far, the PRC government has been unwilling to go all the
way and transform the majority of the SOEs into stock companies that
could still be partly owned by the government, but whose management
and property rights would be out of reach of direct interference. Given
the party/government habit of interfering, merely securitizing the com-
panies alone, is probably not sufficient to provide the companies with
the necessary independence. The companies need to be at least partly
privatized. So far, only a small part of the companies has been allowed
to transfer shares.
The central government has tried to save its ailing firms by struc-
turing mergers, breaking them up into smaller management units, sell-
ing shares, transferring surplus labor to service industries, and inviting
foreign investment. Privatization has been largely avoided. In the end,
however, a large part of the SOEs will probably have to be privatized
as the government cannot afford to keep subsidizing them. The most
effective way of forcing companies to be efficient is to privatize them.
The official line is still that the bulk of the SOEs will not be privatized,
and the state will maintain its leading position in China's economy." 9
Even if this is only government rhetoric and many SOEs are privatized,
much is likely to remain unchanged. The government is in many cases
going to keep a large enough share to ensure effective control of the
companies. Moreover, all Chinese companies are likely to continue to
be heavily regulated by a government that believes in state-managed
growth. The companies will still answer to large, powerful public or
semi-public organizations and private investors are not likely to acquire
all the rights they have in Western countries.120
fering too much with state-run companies' daily operations. But the fact remains, the
interference creates conflicts of interests and affects efficiency.
119. CHINA DAILY, June 21, 1995.
120. Solomon M. Karmel, EMERGING SECURITIES MARKETS IN CHINA: CAPITAL-
ISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, 140 CHINA QUARTERLY 1105, 1120 (1994).
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7.3. Collective Ownership (Ownership by the Workers)
There does not exist much legislation on collective property. For
the collective enterprises the lack of regulation is harmful, as their le-
gal status is very uncertain. The foundation for collective property is
outlined in article 8 of the Constitution:
The contract responsibility system of rural household pro-
duction-related and other forms of consumer cooperatives be-
long to the sector of the socialist economy under collective own-
ership of the working people. Working people who are members
of rural economic collectives have the right, within the limits
prescribed by law, to farm private plots of crop land and hilly
land, engage in household sideline production and raise pri-
vately owned livestock.121
The various forms of cooperative economy in the cities and
towns, such as those in the handicraft, industrial, building,
transport, commercial and service trades, all belong to the sec-
tor of socialist economy under collective ownership by the work-
ing people.
The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the ur-
ban and rural economic collectives and encourages, guides and
helps the growth of the collective economy.
The primary task of the collectives is to cultivate the land. The
collectives own the farm land and have the right to contract out land-
use rights to the peasants for a maximum thirty year period. Within
the contract time, the farmers have the right (with restrictions) to
transfer the land to another farmer. The farmland land-use right sys-
tem is discussed in section 11.
Rather unexpectedly, it is the "sideline occupations" of the collec-
tives that have developed into a major engine of the Chinese economy.
Since the agricultural reform has produced surplus labor, many peas-
ants have been freed to pursue other occupations. A large part of this
workforce has been absorbed by the new collective industries that have
experienced fast growth during the last decade. These rural industries,
known as township and village enterprises (TVE) are active primarily
in light industry but are also found in heavy industry as well as in the
service, construction and transport sectors. The TVEs are highly com-
petitive, since they do not have protected markets as do many of the
121. The first paragraph of article 8 was amended in 1993 in order to incorporate
the household responsibility system into the Constitution.
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state-owned companies. The TVEs compete with each other both in the
domestic and the export market. While the central government is will-
ing to bail out bleeding SOEs, the local governments normally refuse to
aid the TVEs. As a result, many TVEs go bankrupt. However, since
these rural industries are small and seldom have had access to bank
credit, the consequences to society are limited. Millions of TVEs fail
every year, but those who survive get stronger.1 2 It is an example of
survival of the fittest in the unregulated part of the Chinese economy.
The ownership structure of the TVEs differs from SOEs. In many
cases the owners are units of local government on different levels.
Other TVEs are owned by groups of households. In many provinces,
the "collective industry" is simply a cover for private companies, that,
for different reasons, prefer to be labeled as TVEs. Since these types of
enterprises have developed spontaneously, almost no laws exist to regu-
late the TVEs.123 The company forms available in China today do not
fit the very special collective enterprises. Moreover, the creation of
shareholding companies or limited liability corporations requires large
amounts of capital, 10 million yuan ($1.2 million) and 500,000 yuan
($60,000) respectively. These sums are too high for collective enter-
prises considering that an average TVE has a fixed-asset value of
300,000 yuan ($37,000).124
Thus, millions of small rural companies do not fit into any com-
pany form found in Chinese law. The unsure status of the TVEs have
left them vulnerable to intervention from local bureaucrats. In some
areas, local governments change the ownership of the TVE or simply
take away property from the companies. Furthermore, random levies
and fines are frequently imposed upon the companies. A new township
law is currently being drafted. The central government has promised
that this law will clarify the legal status of the TVEs and protect their
property rights.1 2 5 However, considering the weak legal system in
China, it remains to be seen what impact this new law will have.
7.4. Individual and Private Entity Ownership
Individual property ownership in pre-reform communist China
played a limited role. All land and almost all means of production were
122. Survey: China, THE ECONOMIST (INT'L EDITION), Nov. 28, 1992, at 17.
123. Id.
124. The average assets of a TVE probably cannot be assessed with any certainty.
An expatriate banker in Beijing put it like this: "There are lies, damn lies, statistics
and then there are Chinese statistics."
125. CHINA DAILY, Mar. 13, 1995.
INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE PROPERTY LAW
owned by the state or by the collectives, which the state controlled. 126
The individual owned his "lawfully" owned income and savings and
could in fact also own his house, but not the site the house rested on. In
the countryside, peasants were allowed to keep small plots and a lim-
ited amount of livestock for household needs. 12 7 With the beginning of
economic reforms, the individual was gradually allowed to own and/or
control more property. The 1982 Constitution, which was enacted in
the beginning of the reforms, to some extent reflects the shift to more
diverse forms of ownership.
As mentioned above, article 8 of the Constitution gives the peas-
ants a land-use right to farm land through a contract system, and al-
lows the farmers more freedom to engage in sideline production. The
right to own and run individual businesses was recognized in article
L1's first paragraph:
The individual economy of urban and rural working peo-
ple, operating within the limits prescribed by law, is a comple-
ment to the socialist public economy. The state protects the
lawful rights and interests of the individual economy.
The state guides, assists and supervises the individual econ-
omy by administrative control.
The term "individual economy" (geti jingji) refers basically to
one-man operations. At the outset, these entrepreneurs were not al-
lowed to hire other workers, but interim regulations soon allowed them
to hire two "assistants" and five "apprentices." 1 8 Many of these new
firms soon expanded beyond a workforce of eight workers. These com-
panies were tolerated by the government but they had no foundation in
law. Often, these private enterprises were disguised as TVEs, as that
was regarded as being safer than a purely private owned enterprise. As
the private companies grew, it became apparent that they needed to be
regulated by law. Therefore, article 11 of the Constitution was
amended in 1988 by adding a third paragraph:
The state permits the private economy to exist and to de-
126. In the early 1950s, private ownership to the means of production was allowed
and that right was also stated in the 1954 Constitution. However, as mentioned in
section 3.3.1 infra, the 1954 Constitution was never properly implemented before it was
swept away by the radicalization of Chinese society. CHEN, supra note 14, at 42.
127. Alison W. Conner, Individual Ownership of Property in the People's Repub-
lic of China, 21 VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN UBERSEE, 430, 432 (1988).
128. Conner, supra note 74, at 6.
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velop within the limits prescribed by law. The private economy
is a complement to the socialist public economy. The state pro-
tects the lawful rights and interests of the private economy and
provides guidance, supervision and control.
This article is the foundation for the private economy (siying
fingji) in China. Private companies are allowed to exist, but only as a
complement to the state sector. 12 9 Furthermore, the state has reserved
large parts of the economy, such as most of the heavy industry sector,
for the state (see section 7.2 above). The ideological justification for
allowing private ownership of means of production in a communist soci-
ety was the "primary stage" theory (see section 6.1 above).
According to the Civil Code, article 75,130 the Chinese citizen to-
day is allowed to own his lawfully earned income, savings, house, arti-
cles used in daily life, cultural objects, books and reference materials,
trees, livestock and means of production3 1 as well as other lawful prop-
erty. Lawful income includes not only the income from one's own labor,
but also any other income obtained through lawful means. Chinese le-
gal textbooks mention trading, inheritance, 132 income from renting a
house or lending. 13 Moreover, income from stock certificates, patent,
trademark and insurance proceeds should be lawful since these rights
are recognized in the Civil Code.
A Chinese citizen may own his own dwelling, 34 but he may not
acquire freehold rights to the land, since all land belongs to the state or
the collectives. However, the right to an apartment can be time limited
if the land the building rests on is leased from the state. Renewal of
this lease can be costly. On the other hand, apartment-owners in build-
129. The most important regulation for private enterprise besides the Constitution
is the Provisional Regulations of the P.R.C. concerning private enterprises, promul-
gated June 25, 1988 and effective July 1, 1988. Id. at 1.
130. The list in article 75 of the CIVIL CODE has support in article 13 of the
Constitution.
131. Private interests can own many different means of production, but some ar-
eas are still restricted.
132. Right to inherited property is especially protected in Art. 76 of the CIVIL
CODE.
133. Conner, supra note 127, at 435.
134. The Chinese people are encouraged to buy their own homes since the state
wants to move away from the costly welfare state that provides cheap housing for ev-
eryone. SOEs have created construction funds that the workers contribute to, so that
the SOEs can construct housing. These apartments are then sold at low cost to the
workers. Another new way of financing housing construction in China is house mort-
gages. See CHINA DAILY, June 19 & 21, 1995.
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ings erected on state land belonging to SOEs do not suffer the same
risk of having to pay twice for their dwelling, because that land has not
been granted with a time-limit. The complicated land-use rights are
discussed in detail in section 10 below.
A Chinese citizen today can own more or less the same things a
Westerner can, with the exception of land. However, even though the
mere existence of these rights is a giant leap forward for China, the
rights are not well protected from intervention either by other parties
or the government.
7.5. Transfer of Property
The general rule for transfer of ownership is stated in article 72 of
the Civil Code:
In acquiring ownership there must not be a violation of the
provisions of the law. Where property is acquired through con-
tract or other lawful means, ownership is transferred at the
time the property is delivered, unless the law or the agreement
of the parties provides otherwise.
This very general rule states that unless especially provided, own-
ership is transferred when the property is delivered. This probably also
means that a bona fide purchaser gains protection from the seller's
creditors when the property is delivered. An agreement between two
parties is possibly not binding for a third party acting in good faith.
This is, however, just an assumption, since Chinese law is very unclear
on this point. 135
As has been mentioned in section 6.2 above, transfer of vehicles,
ships, airplanes and securities must go through a registration procedure
to be valid. The same applies to transfer of real estate land-use rights.
8. Leasing
Investigating a country's leasing market is reliable indicator of
how well the property system works. Leasing is interesting because the
lessor retains legal title even though the lessee has actual possession.13 6
135. I have spoken to Chinese legal scholars and several lawyers about this spe-
cific problem, but none has been able to give me a clear answer to this question.
136. The client company who leases the equipment is called lessee in this article.
The leasing companies themselves prefer to call the lessee "the end-user," since accord-
ing to the leasing contract the lessee will normally end up as owner of equipment at the
expiration of the lease.
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That the lessee has possession of the goods makes the leasing compa-
nies especially vulnerable in a country where the property system is less
developed, like China. In the absence of a reliable legal framework,
actual possession often means a de facto ownership, regardless of who
actually holds the title to the property.
Leasing is a preferred option for companies without the strong
credit rating needed to go directly to banks. There are two major kinds
of leases: operational and financial (capital) leases. An operational
lease is a short-term and cancelable lease. The leased equipment is re-
turned to the lessor at the expiration of the leasing contract. A finan-
cial lease is a long term lease and normally cannot be canceled. In
effect, it is an installment purchase plan, where the ownership is turned
over to the lessee at the expiration of the leasing contract. In China,
financial leases are often structured as six installments over three years.
Financial leasing is the most common type of leasing agreement in
China today.13 7 The demand for operational leases is not as large.138
When a financial lease is entered into, a Chinese or a joint venture
(JV) leasing company borrows money from a bank and uses the funds
to buy equipment for the lessee. A JV company can often get funds
from foreign banks whereas Chinese companies typically lack the credi-
bility needed to borrow from that source. Under the purchase agree-
ment between the manufacturer and the lessor, the lessee will be
named as the user in the contract but the ownership will be retained by
the lessor. The point of this arrangement is that the end-user may then
claim warranty under the contract with the manufacturer. After the
installation certificate has been signed, the leasing company has noth-
ing more to do with the equipment. The leasing company assumes the
economic but not the technical risk.
Financial leasing in China is different from the West. The pay-
back time is very short, normally only three years. The payback time is
too short to let the machines pay themselves off, but no leasing com-
pany is prepared to grant a ten year payment period (which in many
cases would better reflect the depreciation) because of the market risk.
Furthermore, a guarantee from a third party is always needed. If the
property system was really reliable in China, a guarantee would not be
needed. One major benefit with leasing in many Western countries is
that the leased equipment does not show up as an asset in the book-
keeping, but as a cost. The purpose is to improve the companies' debt-
137. Financial leasing has channeled $ 4.5 billion to Chinese companies in the last
14 years. CHINA DAILY BUSINESS WEEKLY, June 11-17, 1995.
138. According to a Bank of China source.
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to-equity ratio.139 In China, the end-user lists the equipment as an asset
and does not get this benefit. Since the payback period is so short, a
guarantee is needed, and the way bookkeeping is done means that leas-
ing in China is not really leasing at all, but much more like acquiring a
bank loan.
A financial lease typically concerns heavy machinery or production
lines, which usually are not meant to be removed. The lessor's security
is the ownership of the equipment and, normally, a guarantee extended
from a local bank or a company, 40 often a local government owned
entity. The leasing companies have encountered a lot of problems
when, upon failure by the end-user to pay, they have tried to get their
money back. About thirty Japanese and European leasing companies
have lost about $ 600 million over the last few years in the Chinese
market."" Some of these losses have been caused by the way leasing
companies conducted business. The solidity of the lessee and the local
guarantor were not always thoroughly investigated, as the leasing com-
panies were more focused on leasing volume than on secure investment.
First, to get a guarantor to pay on first demand is almost always
out of the question, and the lessor is usually told by the guarantor to
try to repossess the equipment from the lessee regardless of whether the
guarantee is "on first demand." '142 If all negotiations fail, the lessor is
then left with the option of going to the economic section of the Peo-
ple's Court or arbitration 43 and trying to acquire a court order to com-
pel the guarantor to pay, the lessee to pay or seize the property from
the lessee. As discussed in section 6 above, going to court in China and
then getting a court order enforced is hard at best, and often impossi-
ble, especially when the lessee company is situated outside the big met-
139. The debt-to-equity ratio shows the amount of a company's assets that are
provided by creditors in relation to the amount provided by stockholders. The larger
the debt-to-equity ratio, the more fixed obligations the company has, and the riskier the
situation. Thus, a company with a low debt-to-equity ratio is regarded as more solid.
140. Earlier, government agencies often would guarantee loans but this is not al-
lowed since 1988. See below for further comments. Interview with Ludwig Fella, Assis-
tant Manager, China Universal Leasing, Beijing, P.R.C. (June 9, 1995). See also
P.R.C. JOINT VENTURES: CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS, ASSET VALUATION & FINANCING
159 (Katrina Matthews ed., 1996).
141. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Jan. 12, 1995.
142. Gernot G. Klfilss at China Universal Leasing said it like this: "I don't think
some of the Chinese guarantors even know what the meaning of 'on first demand' is."
Interview with Gernot G. Klllss, General Manager, China Universal Leasing, Beijing,
P.R.C. (Apr. 4, 1995).
143. The economic section of the People's Court seems to be preferred to arbitra-
tion by the leasing companies. Interview with Shu Xiao Dong, Manger, Bank of China,
Trust and Consultancy Co., Leasing Dept., Beijing, P.R.C. (Mar. 17, 1995).
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ropolitan areas. Leasing contracts commonly used today state that the
appropriate court is the domicile of the lessor.14 4 However, even if the
economic court in Beijing, for example, issues a court order that gives
the lessor the right to reclaim the property, the lessor still needs to get
the local court at the lessee's domicile to honor that court order to en-
force the judgment. Not surprisingly, local courts are often not espe-
cially helpful to "outsiders."
Even in the event the leasing company is successful in repossessing
the property and the equipment has been well maintained, a second-
hand market for these types of machinery is virtually non-existent in
China. The equipment will either be resold at a very low price or will
sit in a warehouse, incurring costs. Given the collection costs, the un-
sure results of the collection procedure and the low market value of the
repossessed equipment, the leasing companies usually often only use re-
possession as a threat and prefer a negotiated settlement when possible,
even if that means that the amount recovered is significantly less than
the fees owed.
Another problem encountered when trying to repossess the equip-
ment is that the machinery has been used as the lessee's contribution to
an equity JV with a foreign company and the machines have been
transferred to the JV, which is a separate entity. To get the machines
from the JV can be very hard if not impossible, since the JV manage-
ment is likely to claim good faith (meaning the machines belong to the
JV and not the leasing company). It is unclear whether a JV success-
fully could claim good faith, since they have at least a reasonable duty
to find out who actually owns the equipment brought into the JV.1 5
Since there is no functioning title registration system for personal, mov-
144. In the late 1980s, the contracts did not contain this clause, making enforce-
ment of the agreement even harder. Interview with Gernot G. Kliss, General Manager,
China Universal Leasing, Beijing, P.R.C. (Apr. 4, 1995).
145. See CHINA FINANCE MANUAL 17-18 (Brian W. Semkow ed., 1995). JV
property rights are regulated by the Implementing Regulations for the Law of the
P.R.C. on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, promulgated by the State Council
(Sep. 20, 1983) and amended by the State Council (Jan. 15, 1986 and Dec. 21,
1987)[hereinafter the Implementing Regulations to the Equity Joint Venture Law];
and Certain Regulations on the Subscription of Capital by the Parties to Sino-Foreign
Joint Equity Enterprises, approved Dec. 30, 1987 by the State Council and jointly
promulgated Jan. 1, 1988 by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce [hereinafter the Joint Ven-
ture Capital Regulations]. The regulations require assets brought into the JV to be free
of third party rights. However there are a number of ways to get around the problem.
The JV could get the lessor to agree to the transfer by compensating him, or the JV
could refuse to let the Chinese partner use the machinery as its in kind contribution to
the JV.
INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE PROPERTY LAW
able property in China today," 6 how can the leasing company prove
the JV's bad faith? 147 When dealing with SOEs, the circumstances are
a bit different. When entering into a JV, the SOE needs to get an Asset
Evaluation Report, which is a certificate issued by the State Asset
Evaluation Authority that certifies that the SOE actually owns the
property it contributes to the JV.148 Other than trying to get the equip-
ment back from a third party a lessor could try to get money or an-
other asset from the lessee. However, often there are no assets of signif-
icant value to be found.
Getting compensation from the guarantor is also difficult. Often,
local banks will claim they have no funds to pay the guarantee and
refuse to pay, and a local court is often not willing to force the bank
into paying. Local government agencies or companies will act in much
the same way, claiming that they were forced to sign the guarantee and
they therefore are not guilty, or claim that there is no money available
to pay the guarantee. The local court is neither willing nor has the
power to force the local government to honor their promises. One of the
most painful lessons to learn from doing business in China is that guar-
antees from a local government agency are not necessarily honored and
the central government does not necessarily stand behind the commit-
ments of its SOEs." 9 Since 1988, government agencies are not allowed
to guarantee loans or leasing.15 0 Today, the local government creates
government-owned companies which in turn give the guarantees on
146. In the1995 Secured Interests Law, a personal property registration system is
provided. The local industry and commerce administration is supposed to register liens
on machinery according to articles 34 and 42. Whether or not this registration system
can be used to register lessor ownership is unclear. However, it is likely that it will take
some time before this registration system will work properly. Secured Interests Law of
the P.R.C., 8th Nat'l People's Cong., 14th Sess. (1995).
147. One legal counsel put it like this: "We would of course deny any knowledge
whatsoever. What can the suing party do? Claim that we are dishonest [in front of a
Chinese court] ?" Interview with Gernot G. Kiiss, General Manager, China Universal
Leasing, Beijing, P.R.C. (Apr. 4, 1995).
148. The purpose of the Asset Evaluation Report is to prevent state assets from
being given away or sold below fair market value by the SOEs. The Report sets the
value of the property and approves of the transfer of assets to the JV. The foreign
partner normally demands to see this report. According to different lawyers in Beijing,
this is sufficient proof for the foreign partner to know that the assets belong to the
SUE.
149. Interview with Gernot G. Kliiss, General Manager, China Universal Leasing,
Beijing, P.R.C. (Apr. 4, 1995).
150. Interview with Ludwig Fella, Assistant Manager, China Universal Leasing,
Beijing, P.R.C. (June 9, 1995). See also P.R.C. JOINT VENTURES: CAPITAL CONTRIBU-
TIONs, ASSET VALUATION & FINANCING 159 (Katrina Matthews ed., 1996).
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loans and leases, thus making claims against the local government itself
more difficult.15 1
To put a company into bankruptcy can be hard in China, espe-
cially if the company is state-owned. If the lessor manages to put the
lessee or the guarantor into bankruptcy, the lessor may find only an
empty shell, since the assets will have been moved out of the company
without proper consideration. Reclamation of these assets would be
difficult.' 5 2
What then can a leasing company do to recover its investment if
negotiation fails and the local court is not willing to cooperate? In some
cases, talking to the city officials will help, since they will be concerned
with preserving the city's reputation, especially if the leasing company
is big and well-connected. Since the local government (together with
the CCP) exercises significant influence over the local SOEs, banks and
courts, the leasing company may end up being paid a bit of the money
owed from another bank or company by order from the local
government.
Sometimes this cooperation from the local government might ap-
pear to help more than it actually does, as one leasing company in the
Sichuan province discovered. A company owned by the local govern-
ment in Chongqing had leased some machinery from the lessor. The
lease was guaranteed by a Chongqing government agency. After a
while the lessee became unable to pay the fees and the lessor went to
the guarantor. Unfortunately, the government agency didn't have the
funds needed to fulfill its guarantee. The Chongqing city government
refused to take responsibility for the guarantee and said that the only
way the lessor would get its money back was to put the lessee into
bankruptcy. The court went along with the bankruptcy proceedings but
appraised the lessee company assets so low that the lessor ended up
with little compensation after the assets had been sold off. The assets
151. The 1988 regulation that prohibited local government agencies from guaran-
teeing loans was not immediately noticed by the leasing companies who continued to
rely on such guarantees for a long period afterwards. After 1988, when a lease guaran-
teed by local government agency went bad, the agencies then claimed that the agency
didn't have the authority to give the guarantee and it was therefore void.
In 1991, the Guarantee Procedures regulation was enacted which further limited
which organizations may give guarantees. The regulation also restricted the conditions
under which a guarantee can be given. Failure to comply with this regulation will make
the guarantee worthless. See Will Dennis, Capital Contribution and Financing, in THE
LIFE AND DEATH OF A JOINT VENTURE IN CHINA 51, 61 (Duncan Freeman, ed., 1994).
152. I have spoken with drafters of a new bankruptcy law, who indicate that they
are working to make it easier to reclaim property that was transferred without proper
consideration. However, I suspect enforcement will still be difficult.
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were bought by the city which continued the production, but now with-
out debts. To be fair, it is not only in China one hears about these types
of bankruptcy stories, but what differs is that in China the courts are
not independent and take orders from the government, which in this
case sets the price. 153
Aircraft leasing is the type of leasing that seems to work the best.
A large part of the leasing is done through the Civil Aviation Adminis-
tration of China (CAAC), which also runs airlines, some directly and
others indirectly. The CAAC has decided to use leasing as a principal
means of acquiring new aircraft. Since the CAAC is a big, professional
government agency and airline which cannot afford not to pay if it
wants to keep on leasing planes, it is regarded as a trustworthy lessee.
Furthermore, airlines are regarded as solid investments because their
planes usually fly full and tickets are paid in cash. Also, since many of
the leased aircraft fly overseas, they are easier to repossess than other
leased objects. However, lessors may need to be cautious even in this
industry in the future, since the Bank of China has indicated that it
may stop guaranteeing aircraft leases. 15
A new law to regulate the leasing industry is expected.1 55 Even
though a new regulation will help, the problem is not the actual laws in
China today, but the enforcement of these laws and the general atti-
tude towards honoring debts. The leasing companies have learned their
lessons the hard way in China and are now more cautious. Leasing, as
done in the West, is ill-suited for a country with an unreliable, still
developing legal system. As China develops and the leasing companies
learn how to act in the Chinese market, problems are likely to decrease.
V. REAL PROPERTY ("IMMOVABLES")
9. Overview
Nothing is are so closely connected with the word property as
land, especially so in China with its large peasant population. Promise
of land reform was an important reason why the communists succeeded
in rallying the peasants to their side during the civil war. Under the
ensuing land reform, land was initially redistributed to the peasants
with ownership rights. However, after the collectivization in 1955, indi-
153. Interview with Wang Weiguo, Professor of Law, Chinese University of Polit-
ics and Law, Beijing, P.R.C. (July 8, 1995).
154. BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 19, 1994, at 11. According to BUSINESS WEEK, in late
1994 Chinese carriers had up to 100 aircraft on order and planed to lease at least 80
percent of them. Id.
155. CHINA DAILY BUSINESS WEEKLY, June 11-17, 1995.
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vidual land ownership was abolished and formal ownership of land was
transferred from the peasants to the collectives organized at the village
level. Urban land was nationalized.
Still today, all land in China is either owned by the State or the
Collectives. Generally speaking, all urban land belongs to the state and
most rural land belongs to the collectives. The foundation for land own-
ership is laid out in the 1982 Constitution.
Article 9 of the Constitution states that all mineral resources, wa-
ters, forests, mountains, grass-lands, unreclaimed land, beaches and
other natural resources are owned by the state with the exception of
forests, mountains, grasslands, unreclaimed land and beaches that are
owned by collectives in accordance with the law. 156
Article 10 originally stated that: 157
Land in the cities is owned by the state.
Land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by collec-
tives except for those portions which belong to the state in ac-
cordance with the law; house sites and private plots of cropland
and hilly land are also owned by collectives.
The state may in the public interest take over land for its
use in accordance with the law.
No organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or
lease land or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by unlaw-
ful means.
All organizations and individuals who use land must make
rational use of the land.
After the collectivization, the collectives formally owned their
land. In practice, however, the state assumed tight control over transfer
rights including the sale, rent or exchange of land. Use rights were
vested in the collective, but crop choice and sale prices were all decided
by the state.1 8 This changed with the household contract system intro-
duced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. The collectives still could not sell the
land but were now given the right to contract out land use rights to
individual farmers who paid for their rent by selling a part of their crop
156. Chinese law makes a difference between resources and the land itself. There-
fore, article 9 of the Constitution regulates resources and article 10 the land itself.
157. The fourth paragraph of article 10 was amended in 1988. This is discussed
later in this section.
158. Mark Selden & Aiguo Lu, The Reform of Land Ownership and the Political
Economy of Contemporary China, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINESE DEVELOP-
MENT 187, 187 (Mark Selden & Aiguo Lu, eds., 1993).
INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE PROPERTY LAW
to the state. The household system was a tremendous success and agri-
cultural production increased rapidly.
A large part of the real property is managed by the SOEs, which
have been allocated use rights to the land for an indefinite term without
any significant compensation. Usually, the SOEs pay only a small an-
nual fee. The land rights are limited. The SOEs cannot transfer their
allocated land to a third party. However, since the early 1980s the
SOEs have been allowed to use their land as in-kind contribution to a
JV (provided the government approved). This right was still severely
restricted and did not grant the JV the power to buy, sell or mortgage
the property. In light of the current Chinese real estate boom, it seems
hard to believe that land was regarded as almost worthless until the
late 1980s and the acquisition of land was only a bureaucratic
arrangement.
As China opened up to foreign investment, it became more and
more evident that untransferable land ownership rights were not very
practical. In the new Special Economic Zones (SEZ), a system that
allowed the rental of state land was attempted. However, neither the
Chinese nor the foreign investors were pleased with the system which
required the foreign investors to pay an annual rent. The fee was speci-
fied by law, without regard to changing conditions of the real estate
market. 169 Nor could the JVs mortgage the land as a mean of getting
funds. Chinese-foreign JVs were not the only losing parties in this sys-
tem. The city governments did not get much money from these short-
term land use leases. 110 Denying others land ownership, the state itself
had to bear the burden of developing land in the cities. As the State
lacked funds for this development, prime real estate parcels in big cities
like Beijing could lie idle for decades and infrastructure construction
went slow.
However, to allow private land ownership was ideologically hard
for the CCP to accept, since privatization would create new landlords,
the old class enemy. The solution was to allow purchase of land usage
rights which were valid for a limited duration of time. The first land
159. The fees are dealt with in the Implementing Regulations to the Equity Joint
Venture Law, supra note 145, arts. 47-53.
160. According to official Chinese statistics, the land-use fees and other related
charges that the government of the Shenzhen SEZ collected from 1980 to 1987 were
only 38 million Yuan. This was not even sufficient to pay for the interest on the 600
million Yuan investment by the Chinese Government in land development and infra-
structure during the same time. See Henry Z. Zheng, The Special Economic Zones
and Coastal Cities, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, 43 (W. Strong & A. Wilcox eds.,
1993).
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transfers took place in 1987 in the SEZ of Shenzhen.' 1' At that time,
this practice lacked support in the Constitution, but shortly afterwards,
on April 12, 1988, the fourth paragraph of article 10 of the Constitu-
tion was amended to read:
No organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or
unlawfully transfer land in other ways. The right to the use of
land may be assigned in accordance with the provisions of the
law.
(Emphasis added.)
The same year, article 2 of the Land Administration Law was
amended to allow state-owned and collective-owned land to be alien-
ated for value. 62 Detailed national regulations had yet to be issued but
the legal foundation for using property as a commodity had been cre-
ated. In 1990, a few years after the SEZs promulgated their land-use
rights regulations, a national regulation on granting land use rights was
passed.'
The local and national land grant regulations gave land value and
created a real estate market. This new market, combined with double
digit economic growth, soon created a booming real estate industry.
The SEZs and the major cities soon looked like big construction sites.
The development sometimes went out of control. Zoning laws were dis-
regarded and in some places, like Shanghai, office construction in-
creased past any reasonable demand forecast.""4 Another result of the
real estate boom was increasing corruption. Since the land-use grants
involve large sums of money and are administered by poorly paid civil
servants, the potential for corruption is large.16 5 In the suburban and
rural areas, large areas of precious agricultural land were taken for
housing construction as the cities grew.166
161. CHINA BUSINESS LAW GUIDE ) 85-620 (Sally A. Harpole ed., 1991).
162. Law of the P.R.C. on Land Management (also known as the Land Adminis-
tration Law), 6th Nat'l People's Cong., 16th Sess. (1986) (amended 1986) [herinafter
LAL].
163. Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning the
Grant and Assignment of the Right to Use State Land in Urban Areas, (1990) [here-
inafter 1990 Grant Regulations].
164. Survey: China, THE ECONOMIST (INT'L EDITION), March 18, 1995.
165. See Finder, supra note 71, at 20.
166. Growing Pains, THE ECONOMIST (INT'L EDITION), Mar. 18, 1995 at 24.
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10. Urban Land
10.1. Land-Use Rights
The national regulations concerning land use rights are the 1986
Land Administration Law (LAL),'" the 1991 implementation rules to
the LAL, 68 the 1990 Grant Regulations,'6 6 the 1992 Allocated Land
Measures,"" and the 1994 Urban Real Estate Management Law
(UML).' 7 ' While also providing new provisions, the UML to a large
extent repeats what already had been stated in previous legislation.
The regulations draw a distinction between urban and collective
land. All urban land belongs to the state and the surrounding suburban
land normally belongs to different collectives.' 72 Only state-owned land
can be transferred to a third party.' Therefore, land belonging to the
collectives has to be nationalized before it can be granted. '7
Another distinction is drawn between "Granted" and "Allocated"
land. Granted land has a time limit on usage and can be transferred for
value. Allocated land is given without consideration and normally has
no time limit, but cannot be transferred. 7 5
10.2. Granted Land-Use Rights
The definition of a grant of land is found in article 8 of the 1990
Grant Regulations: "The term 'grant of the right to use land' refers to
the act by which the State, in its capacity as land owner, grants the
right to use land for a certain number of years to a land user and the
land user pays to the State a fee for the grant of the right to use land."
The maximum time limits of the land-use right are determined by
the purpose of the use:17 6
167. See LAL, supra note 162.
168. Rules for Implementation of the Law of the P.R.C. on Land Management,
promulgated Jan. 4, 1991 by the State Council.
169. See 1990 Grant Regulations, supra note 163.
170. Provisional Measures on Administration of Allocated Land Use Rights
(1992) [hereinafter Allocated Land Measures].
171. Urban Real Estate Management Law of the P.R.C., 8th Nat'l People's
Cong., 8th Sess. (effective 1995) [hereinafter UML].
172. LAL, art. 6.
173. See for example P.R.C. CONST. art. 10, 4, and LAL art. 2, $ 2.
174. UML, supra note 171. art. 8. That only state land may be transferred is
implied in the 1990 Grant Regulations, but the UML makes it explicit.
175. 1990 Grant Regulations, supra note 163, arts. 8, 42-44.
176. Id. art. 12.
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(1) 70 years for residential purposes;
(2) 50 years for industrial purposes;
(3) 50 years for educational, scientific, technological, cultural,
public health or sport purposes;
(4) 40 years for commercial, tourism or recreational purposes;
(5) 50 years for comprehensive use or other purposes.
Land-use rights may be acquired by auction, tender or agree-
ment.1 7 Land for commercial, tourist, entertainment and luxury resi-
dence purposes must adopt the manner of auctioning or bidding when
possible.1 7 8 Only if these means are impossible may bilateral negotia-
tions be adopted.1 9 These practices are intended to allow the market to
set the price instead of artificially fixing it by law.
When the land-use right is granted, a contract shall be entered
into by the State Land Administration Bureau 80 (SLAB) and the land
user.181 There are different standard forms for the grant contracts.
Since the SLAB normally insists upon using these standard contracts,
the grantee is likely to be unable to change the major terms of the
contract. As a result, the negotiations normally focus on the price and
the duration of the contract and not the restrictive covenants. 182
After the grant contract is entered into, the land-user has to pay
the land-use fee within 60 days. 8 ' If the grantee fails to pay the fee
within the allotted time, the grantor has the right to rescind the con-
tract and demand liquidated damages.' 8 ' When the land-use fee is paid
in full, the SLAB will issue a land-use certificate (tud-
ishiyongzheng).185 This certificate is the proof of title to the land-use
right. This document is needed for transfer of the property. After the
construction of the premises on the land is completed, the Real Estate
177. Id. art. 13.
178. UML, supra note 171, art. 12.
179. Id.
180. The Land Administration Bureau of the municipal or county People's Gov-
ernment is the grantor of the land-use contracts. See 1990 Grant Regulations, supra
note 163, art. 11.
181. UML, supra note 171, art. 14.
182. Zheng, supra note 160, at 43.
183. 1990 Grant Regulations, supra note 163, art. 14.
184. Id. See also UML, supra note 171, art. 15. If the SLAB fails to provide the
land, the grantee can rescind the contract and claim liquidated damages. 1990 Grant
Regulations, supra note 171, art. 15.
185. 1990 Grant Regulations, supra note 163, art. 16; UML, supra note 171, art.
16. To get the land-use certificate, an application has to be made to the SLAB. UML,
supra note 171, art. 60 1.
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Bureau will issue a premises title certificate. 186 The holder of the land-
use rights and the building title holder do not necessarily have to be the
same person or entity with this dual registration system. However, this
practice may bring problems and therefore it is now expressly stated in
the 1990 Grant Regulations that rights to the fixed structures on the
land have to follow the land itself.1
8 7
If land development is not started within a year of the launch date
specified in the Grant Contract, a fine may be collected from the land-
user as a penalty. 188 If the land is still idle after two years, the SLAB
has the right to recover the land without compensation. These penalties
will not be imposed if the delay is due to force majeure. 89 The threat
of penalties is meant to prevent land speculation with idle lots. This
regulation is only partly effective. Well-connected developers have been
known to get large areas of land granted to them by the SLAB, but
have not paid the grant fees. These developers have no capital but will
instead pay the city government after selling off the land. This way of
doing business is not lawful but is done nonetheless, since there are
large sums of money involved.
If a land-user needs to change the purpose of the land-use as spec-
ified in the contract, he must obtain permission from the grantor and
the city planning department. 190 The state will not recover the land-use
right from the land-user before expiration of the term specified in the
contract.'' However, the state reserves the right to expropriate the
land "under special circumstances and in the light of social and public
interests." The land-user will be compensated according to the number
of years left on the contract and the extent to which the land has been
developed. 92 In reality, this generally phrased provision means that the
state can recover land whenever it wants. As the compensation is de-
cided by the government, it tends to be significantly lower than market
value. 93
After the land-use right contract expires, the land with all build-
186. UML, supra note 171, art. 60 2.
187. 1990 Grant Regulations, supra note 163, art. 23.
188. Supra note 171, art. 25.
189. Id.
190. Id. art. 17.
191. Id. art. 19.
192. Id.
193. If the land user is not pleased with the compensation, he can sue the govern-
ment. However, the courts are still under the influence of the state and might or might
not be of help. For a closer look at administrative appeal in China, see Geor Hintzen,
Drilling the State: An Introduction to Administrative Law in the P.R.C., in ADMINIS-
TRATIVE REFORM IN CHINA SINCE 1978, supra note 54 at 1.
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ings on it is returned to the State without compensation. 194 If the land
user needs to continue using the land, he must apply for an extension
no later than one year before the expiration date of the contract. 195
Unless the land needs to be recovered for "social and public" interests,
such an application shall be approved. 196
10.3. Allocated Land-Use Rights
Allocated land-use rights are different from granted rights. The
government provides the land user with land without consideration.1 97
The land-use right normally has no time limit 98 but the land user's
rights can be revoked if the state needs the land. 99 In that case, the
state needs to compensate the land-user for the structures on the
land.200 Furthermore, allocated land may not be transferred without
state consent whereas granted land can be freely transferred. 01
Allocated land is given to state institutions, the military, infra-
structure projects and other projects in accordance with law and ad-
ministrative regulations. 202 If, for example, a developer plans to build a
toll-road, which is very popular in China today, the developer will try
to get allocated land-use rights. Otherwise the cost of acquiring all the
land would be prohibitive. However, the toll-road developer will have to
pay all fees connected with the resettlement of the people already using
the land.
Allocated land-use rights have to be transformed into granted
land-use rights before transfer can be made freely.203 With the ap-
proval of the local SLAB and the local Real Estate Bureau, the allo-
cated land-user has to go through the procedures for the land-use grant
and pay a grant fee.2 4 The difference between allocated and granted
land has led to much confusion. (See section 10.5 below.)
194. All normal structures are returned with the land. "Non-standard" construc-
tions are often required to be demolished and cleared by the time the land is turned
over to the State. See Measures of Shanghai Municipality on the Compensatory Trans-
fer of Land Use Rights, art. 41, Shanghai Municipal People's Gov't (1987).
195. UML, supra note 171, art. 21.
196. Id.
197. Id. art. 22 T1.
198. Id. art. 22 2.
199. Allocated Land Measures, supra note 170, art. 30.
200. Id.
201. See Allocated Land Measures, supra note 170, arts. 5, 6. See also UML,
supra note 171, arts. 36-45 (not requiring state consent).
202. Id.
203. Id. art. 39 1. See also 1990 Grant Regulations, supra note 163, art. 45.
204. Id.
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10.4. Transfer of Land-Use Rights
Granted land-use rights can be sold, inherited, leased or
pledged.2" 5 Allocated land-use rights cannot be transferred without the
consent of the state. 06 Even the transfer of granted land-use rights is
restricted. The total amount of the land-use contract fee has to be paid
before a transfer is permitted, 0 7 but as mentioned earlier, this in real-
ity is not always followed. At least twenty-five percent of the building
has to be finished by the time of a transfer.20 8 If the projects involve
tract land development, land must be ready for industrial use or other
construction. 20 9 To transfer real estate, the land-use certificate and the
certificate of title to the buildings need to be presented to the SLAB.210
Additionally, the parties enter into a transfer contract.211 All rights to
and liabilities from the property are transferred from the seller to the
buyer with respect to the new owner's relationship towards the
SLAB.2 12 The time limit of the land-use is therefore the remaining
time of the period specified in the original Grant Contract.213
In the 1990 Grant Regulations, the state reserved the right to in-
tervene in the real estate market. The local government has a pre-emp-
tive purchase right if the transfer price is "substantially" lower than
the market price. When the market price rises irrationally, the local
government may take "necessary measures. "214
Granted land may also be leased to third parties. If a lease for
profit is made on allocated land, the profits of the lease must be handed
over to the state.21 5 A stamp tax of 0.1 percent of the value of the lease
has to be paid by the parties.216
Mortgaging is a new way of financing loans in China. Mortgage
registration systems have been in effect in the SEZs since the late
205. See generally 1990 Grant Regulations, supra note 163.
206. Allocated Land-Use Measures, supra note 170, art. 5.
207. UML, supra note 171, art. 38.
208. UML, supra note 171, art. 38(2). More specifically, the regulation stipulates
that at least 25 percent of the investment has to be done by the time of the transfer,
not necessarily 25 percent of the actual building. For all practical purposes, the phrases
mean the same thing.
209. Id. For commodity housing, other restrictions apply. See id. art. 44.
210. Id. art. 38.
211. Id. art. 40.
212. Id. art. 41.
213. Id. art. 42.
214. 1990 Grant Regulations, supra note 163, art. 26.
215. UML, supra note 171, art. 52-55.
216. Provisional Rules of the P.R.C. on Stamp Duty app. ) 5 (promulgated Aug.
6, 1988 by the State Council).
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eighties. A national system has been created but it is still in its infancy.
The new guarantee (or secured interests) law provides for a national
mortgage system,21 7 as does the UML. 18 Chinese banks provide mort-
gage loans but most foreign banks are, understandably, still reluctant
to accept Chinese mortgages and require other collateral.21 9
When mortgaging real estate, the mortgagor and mortgagee have
to enter into a written contract .2 2  A stamp tax of 0.5 percent of the
value secured by the pledge also has to be paid by the parties.22 ' All
structures on the land are mortgaged along with the land,222 but build-
ings added after the mortgage is signed are not subject to the mort-
gage.2 23 This practice differs from the main rule in most Western coun-
tries, where all buildings on the land are subject to mortgage,
regardless of whether they are built before or after the signing of the
mortgage contract. The Chinese have written this rule due to the sepa-
rate land and premises title certificate system, and thus it is possible to
own land but not the buildings. However, unified real estate certificates
are allowed under article 62 of the UML. This simplifies the system,
and helps avoid the situation where there are different owners for the
land and the buildings.2
24
According to article 7 of the 1990 Grant Regulations, the land
registration system now implemented by the state is required to be
open to the public in order to provide creditor safety. The common
practice is not to ask to see the books, but to get a certificate from the
SLAB that states that as of a certain date there were no mortgages on
the land.
217. See Secured Interests Law, supra note 146, arts. 33-62.
218. UML, supra note 171, arts. 146-51.
219. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, CHINA: INVESTING, LICENSING, AND
TRADING REPORT 53 (1994). Chinese bankers are still very cautious about mortgages.
To give mortgage loans to private ventures like residential housing or commercial
buildings is not considered as risky. The problem is mortgage loans to SOEs when
enforcement may be a problem. The bank might not be allowed to put a state company
into bankruptcy to sell off the property.
220. UML, supra note 171, art. 49.
221. Stamp Duty Rules, supra note 217, app. ) 11.
222. 1990 Grant Regulations, supra note 163, art. 33.
223. UML, supra note 171, art. 51.
224. That a unified land and premises ownership system can be implemented does
not necessarily mean that China is moving in that direction. The dual ownership sys-
tem for buildings and land is a result of the fact that until the late 1980s land-use
rights could not be transferred for value, but buildings could. The author has under-
stood that the SLAB wants to unify the ownership, but the construction ministry (jian
she bu) so far has managed to prevent that.
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10.5. Problems with the Land-Use Rights System
The Chinese real estate system is by no means perfect. It is a
bridge between socialism and capitalism and was devised as a way of
creating a real estate market while retaining the ideologically impor-
tant state (and collective) ownership of the land. The problem with the
system is that it has developed bit by bit and, the rules of the game
have changed numerous times. It is natural that a new system needs
some time to mature, but many changes affect investor confidence.
The problems include the strange ownership exercised by the col-
lectives, the evasion or disregard for central government regulations by
local government and the difference between allocated and granted
land-use rights. Until the early 1990s, the collectives often sold off
land-use rights (or full ownership to land) to third parties without na-
tionalizing it first. Since the collectives had no power to transfer land,
the buyers' title to the land is legally uncertain. Technically speaking,
the transfer was void and the land-use right is still held by the collec-
tive, but the buildings on the land are still owned by the land user. To
get out of this unfortunate situation, the land user needs to get the land
granted to him. That means that he might have to pay for the land a
second time.
However, the larger problem is the evasion or total disregard by
local government on various levels of central government regulations.
Local officials have to seek central government approval for large land-
use projects, but often evade these rules by breaking up the project on
paper or simply ignoring the rules. Another method applied by the lo-
cal government is to start using the land first and to seek approval af-
terwards, confronting the SLAB with a fait accompli. Local govern-
ments without any special authorization have also created their own
land-use polices that are not in compliance with national regulation. A
buyer of land-use rights, either from local government or from a land-
use right holder, has to be very careful and thoroughly check the basis
for the rights in question. The central government has made clear that
land-use documents illegally approved by a local government will be
declared null and void.225 It is not very likely that the central govern-
ment will always succeed in enforcing their regulations against the will
of local government, but the possibility exists that a land-use grant con-
tract approved by a local government will be declared void by the
SLAB.
Even those companies who have all the right approvals from the
225. CHINA DAILY, June 24, 1995.
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correct authorities might run into unexpected difficulties. Sino-foreign
JVs are experiencing problems dealing with a still-developing land own-
ership system. The Chinese partner's in-kind contribution to a JV has
often been in the form of long-term land-use rights. In the early 1980s
the certificates the Chinese partner produced to prove his right to the
land were not the kind of land-use certificates issued by SLAB after
1990, but land certificates (tudizheng) issued by various government
agencies. These could be local government, planning departments, or
the department in charge of the Chinese partner. All land contributed
to JVs before May 1990 had been allocated land (even though the land
might not have been called that at the time). 26
As discussed above, land-use rights may only be transferred if the
land has been granted to the transferor. However, it soon became ap-
parent that the contribution of land-use rights into a Sino-foreign JV as
an in-kind contribution could constitute a transfer.227 For a while there
was some confusion over whether these regulations applied only to do-
mestic JVs (without any foreign investment) or also to Sino-foreign
JVs. The confusion came about because only the domestic JVs (liany-
ingqiye) and not Sino-foreign JVs (Zhongwai hezi or Hezuo qiye) were
mentioned in the regulation.2 28 Until mid-1994, the SLAB interpreted
the measure so that the Sino-foreign JV land-use rights were not af-
fected. After that date, however, the SLAB stated that land-use rights
may only be contributed to a JV if the land-use rights have been
granted to the Chinese partner in a Sino-foreign JV. 229
This means that JVs who received allocated land contributed to
them after May 1990 did not have the right to the land. JVs who re-
ceived land contributed before that time have a valid legal right, since
the regulations did not exist at the time the JV received the land. In
both cases, the result is the same. The SLAB wants the JVs to pay for
the proper, granted land-use rights. The amount of the grant fee will be
determined after formal appraisal by a licensed appraisal agency. For
JVs established before the existence of the current grant system, this is
a post facto payment that might bring large unexpected costs. From
the SLAB's point of view, it is a question of enforcing the law and
forcing offenders to pay for the land they are using. Furthermore, the
SLAB wants to bring all different 1980s land-use right constructions in
line with the post-1990 system.
226. Nicholas C. Howson, On Shaky Ground: Land Use Rights contributed to
JVs, EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPORTS, Dec. 15, 1994, at 11.
227. Id.
228. Supra note 170, art. 40.
229. Howson, supra note 227, at 11.
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The SLAB has made it clear that the fee for such post facto pay-
ments might be eased somewhat by either extending the payment pe-
riod or assigning some of the value of the granted rights to entities
representing the state, thus creating new partners in the joint venture.
The SLAB has indicated that the fees owed it might be reduced or
exempted upon individual application."' Those companies who do not
comply with this dictate from the Chinese state are taking big risks.
The first risk is that the land-use rights might be seized with only
minimum compensation. This is perhaps what happened in the famous
case with the Wangfujing Street McDonald's franchise. McDonald's
had entered into a JV with the state-owned Beijing General Coopera-
tion of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce. The Chinese partner con-
tributed land-use rights for 20 years to a prime spot on Beijing's busiest
business street. The contract was signed in 1989, and in 1992 the first
McDonald's on mainland China opened. In late 1994, McDonald's was
ordered by the local government to vacate the lot to make room for a
new giant shopping and office complex called the Oriental Plaza. As
compensated, McDonald's would get a slot inside the big plaza. Mc-
Donald's objected because this outlet was very profitable and they did
not want to close for 18 months for construction of the complex. Mc-
Donald's told the press. In the international media, McDonald's was
portrayed as a victim and the impression was made that McDonald's
had a solid right to the spot on Wangfujing Street."
From a Chinese legal standpoint, McDonald's probably did not
have that solid of a right. Whether land-use rights were contributed to
the JV or leased to it, they most likely were not "granted" or subject to
a land grant contract. Thus, since the land had been transferred to the
JV without remedial payment to the SLAB by the holder of the land-
use rights, the land-use rights were revocable. The Beijing municipal
government needed to do little more than to withdraw the permission to
use the allocated land that formed the basis of McDonald's hold on the
underlying site. 32
230. Id. at 12.
231. Bruce Gilley, Tower of Power: Beijing's Oriental Plaza Rises from the
Ashes, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Feb. 15, 1996, at 44.
232. Howson, supra note 230, at 12. That the government had support in law to
remove McDonald's from the site might be true technically, but one wonders what
assurances the city had given McDonald's before and what moral right the city had to
remove the hamburger vendor. In the end, it seems that Ronald McDonald got the last
laugh. Construction of the Oriental Plaza was halted for many months and China lost
investor confidence due to McDonald's clever handling of the press. The matter is set-
tled and McDonald's is rumored to have been given compensation for vacating the lot.
See also Gilley, supra note 232.
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A second risk is that given the unsure status of the land, nobody
will be willing to buy it. Transfer of land might not be possible, which
is of crucial importance to real estate developers who may not be able
to lease or sell real estate erected on such land. Another option denied
these JVs is finance by mortgage, as banks are not likely to accept
mortgages on land with unsure title. 33
The third and perhaps most likely risk with non-compliance is that
the JV has to pay the full grant amount or suddenly be forced to accept
a new partner, who represents the state's interests in the revalued
equity.2 34
11. Rural Land
11.1. 1949-78
On China's rural land live some 900 million people. The exodus of
rural population to the cities that normally characterizes an industrial-
izing nation has only marginally occurred in China. 36 The control
mechanisms that restricted movement of peasants are a lot weaker to-
day than they used to be and migration to the cities is increasing. An
estimated 100 million people are regarded as "floating population" in
China, but the pressure on the cities seen today is nothing compared to
the numbers that will begin to move if the rural policies of the govern-
ment are unsuccessful.
The CCP's rural policy has always focused on increasing agricul-
tural production. However, before 1978, the measures taken often
ranged from bad to disastrous. The post-1949 land reform that gave
farmers individual ownership was merely a first step in the lengthy pro-
cess of increasing agricultural output. In 1955, to raise crop-yields and
to facilitate central planning, the rural land was re-organized into col-
lectives at the village level. The Chinese leaders called this new system
"peasant land ownership." Instead of individual ownership, farmers
collectively got a proprietary right to the produce of the land. However,
the peasant households were each allowed to keep a small private lot." 6
233. Howson, supra note 227, at 12. The banks, not surprisingly, have been hurt
financially as a result of accepting land with unclear title and they are not likely to
repeat their mistakes.
234. Id.
235. As will be noted below, the collectives have exercised such power over the
movement of the peasants that at least until the early 1980s it was very difficult for
them to leave their birth site.
236. Ralph H. Folsom, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
252 (1992).
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Following the 1958-60 Great Leap Forward disaster and up to the
early 1980s, the collective agriculture was organized in communes of
4,000-5,000 peasant households. The commune system was based on a
three-level system with ownership rights divided between the three pri-
mary collective units: the commune, the brigade (usually a natural vil-
lage) and the team. The team, typically comprising thirty to forty
households, was the primary ownership, accounting and management
unit. The power to exercise ownership rights was essentially restricted
to organizing cultivation of the land according to state directives."'
Transfer rights, crop choice and crop sale prices were all controlled by
the state. The restrictions applied even to the small private lots. The
integration of peasants and land was so tight that it can almost be said
that the land owned the people. The collectives exercised tight control
over the workforce and the residents were legally bound to the land,
since they were barred from migrating elsewhere and were obliged to
work for the collective. 238
The commune system was not popular among the peasants, who
were forced to work and live in poverty in massive rural labor camps.
For anybody not of the same high caliber as Lei Feng,23 9 motivation
was low. Thus, in spite of the large scale farming, agricultural output
was so low that one in five Chinese suffered malnutrition. 40
11.2. The Household Responsibility System
The land-use system was fundamentally transformed between
1978-80. A "household responsibility system" was introduced, which
meant that land was contracted out to peasant households. The farmers
had to sell a quota of basic crops to the state at fixed prices but any
surplus could be sold to whomever else they wanted, at market prices.
As the system's designers had intended, agricultural output grew im-
mensely in just a few years. Land was initially only contracted out for
three years but since the farmers then were found to be unwilling to
invest in agriculture, in 1984 the Central Committee extended the
terms to 15 years and allowed inheritance of the land for the duration
237. Selden & Lu, supra note 158, at 188.
238. Id. at 190.
239. Lei Feng, a communist propaganda character, was a model soldier who de-
voted his life to work for society. Even today, the CCP insists that he was a real char-
acter and promotes him as an example for a morally degenerating society. See
JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 597-98 (1990). See also
JUNG CHANG, WILD SWANS 256-58 (1991).
240. TIME (ASIA EDITION), May 15, 1995.
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of the contract. 41 As of September 1995, most of these contracts are
expiring and can now be renewed for another 30 years. 242 Today, the
farmers do not only have land-use rights but they may, under certain
conditions, also transfer the land to another household for the duration
of the contract. However, the state retains the right of eminent domain.
The state may take possession of the contracted land if it pays
compensation. 24
Up until the mid 1980s, there were no laws dealing with land-use
administration. As a result, many contradictory land policies were is-
sued by different sections of the government. Land disputes were com-
mon, and farmers in charge of the partial property rights illegally sold,
rented or mortgaged their land. In 1986, the Land Administration Law
was passed and since then, land ownership and occupation have been
based on law.2 4' However, the property system is still unclear. After
communes were abolished, ownership was supposed to be vested in the
villages, but under the LAL, larger groups suspiciously similar to the
old communes may still own land. 2"1 To avoid ambiguity and subse-
quent disputes, title to land is supposed to be registered with the gov-
ernment at the county level. 46
But as with the urban land-use system, the rural household respon-
sibility system is far from perfect. It is more successful than Mao's
People's Communes, but the current contract system is not especially
efficient either. For one thing, the plots are too small. Since a scientific
evaluation of the land has not been feasible, every family has to have
about the same proportion of each land quality type. 47 This means that
each farmer gets different small patches spread out all over the village
land, instead of one heterogeneous large plot. This system is more remi-
niscent of European farming administration of the medieval age than
241. Selden, Mark & Lu, supra note 158, at 193.
242. CHINA DAILY, June 15, 1995.
243. Selden & Lu, supra note 158, at 195. Investments done on the land by the
peasant must also be compensated. The value the state is supposed to pay is regulated
by LAL art. 28. (See LAL, supra note 162). It states that the compensation should be
three to six times the average annual output of the land in the last three years, plus
payment of a subsidy for rural people who are displaced. This "value" has little to do
with market value and the state has problems enforcing these guidelines. See Selden &
Lu, supra note 158, at 198.
244. LAL, supra note 162.
245. Id. art. 8 (allowing land ownership by "two or more collective economic
entities").
246. Id. art. 9.
247. Qu, Futian et. al., Land Administration in China's Rural Area: Reform and
Its Impact, in ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN CHINA SINCE 1978, supra note 54, at 128.
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of the 20th century. The best way to deal with this problem may be to
allow transfer of land use rights more freely so that all production re-
sources will be distributed efficiently. 4 8 This would be made possible
by giving the farmers a land-use right to farmland similar to the land-
use system used on urban land." 9
The state is aware of this problem but is reluctant to impose
changes that would make many peasants redundant. In the long run,
the government may have no choice but to reform the land manage-
ment system. The state has lost control to some extent over rural land
development. Much arable land is taken every year for housing and
industry development. Moreover, the practice of building tombs to tes-
tify to family status is once again becoming popular,6 0 occupying yet
more land. Another serious problem is the large scale soil erosion.
These factors taken together mean that China is losing much arable
land even as the 1.2 billion population continues to increase by 14 mil-
lion people annually. 51
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the beginning of reform in 1978, Chinese society has under-
gone tremendous changes. In the mid-1970s, there was no real need for
an advanced property law in China since all companies and all land
were owned or de facto controlled by the state. However, in the last
fifteen years, China has made rapid economic advancements and prop-
erty ownership has been diversified. Average incomes have tripled, pri-
vate enterprise is allowed and new venture capital can be raised
through stock markets. The farmers have a land-use right to the land
they cultivate and urban land can be transferred for value.
With the demands of an advanced market economy, it may only
be a few years before China has established modern economic legisla-
tion, including an advanced property law bearing great resemblance to
Western law. The momentum for legal reform is strong in the PRC
today, and many important laws are being passed every year. Com-
pared to other emerging markets, the legal reform in China has been
quick.
248. CHINA DAILY, June 15, 1995.
249. To give farmers a better land-use right than the current contract system al-
lows is proposed by the study group drafting the Chinese Property Law. See FAXUE
YANJIU, supra note 102, at 9.
250. It is forbidden to put graves on arable land. Disregard of this rule could
mean severe punishment during the Mao era, but today this rule is widely ignored.
TIME (AsIA EDITION), May 15, 1995.
251. CHINA DAILY, June 24, 1995.
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However, protection of property rights is another matter alto-
gether. The legal system is still weak in China and there exists no true
rule of law. As long as the CCP holds absolute power, the courts will
never be strong, independent organs. Regional protectionism makes it
difficult to enforce a claim from another part of the country. In the
metropolitan areas of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (Canton), the
enforcement of property rights will work better than in the interior re-
gions. Even in these cities, the function of property law will not be
comparable to Western standards in the foreseeable future. Protection
of property rights will slowly be strengthened, but the PRC still has a
long way to go before actual possession without title is a de facto
weaker right than having the title to the property but no possession.
